

A FEW COMMENTS

ON

MR. GLADSTONE'S EXPOSTULATION.

BY

HENRY CANON NEVILLE,

FORMER PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE COLLEGE OF MAYNOOTH ;

AND

CONSULTING THEOLOGIAN TO SOME OF THE IRISH BISHOPS AT THE VATICAN COUNCIL.

LONDON :

B. M. PICKERING, 196, PICCADILLY.

DUBLIN: McGLASHAN & GILL.

1875.

N.B.—All expressions of Theological doctrines or opinions given in these “Comments,” must be understood to be given under the supreme censorship of the “Sedes Petri,” to which it belongs to hold and prescribe the “Sana forma verborum.”

A FEW COMMENTS

ON

MR. GLADSTONE'S "EXPOSTULATION."

INTRODUCTORY.

ON the 4th November, 1874, Mr. Gladstone, late Prime Minister, published and addressed to his Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen an "Expostulation on the Decrees of the Vatican Council in their bearing on Civil Allegiance." We must adopt the title "Expostulation," as its author has chosen it, but the work is not in the least an Expostulation. Its proper title would be something of this kind—"Animadversions on the Faith of Roman Catholics, since the Vatican Council, in which it is shown: 1, that no Catholic can be loyal; 2, that no man can become a Roman Catholic and retain possession of his mental and moral freedom; 3, that Catholic teaching is irreconcilable with past history and modern progress; 4, that the Catholic religion is to be tolerated only under satisfactory guarantees and explanations."

It is now the middle of January, 1875, and amongst Catholics the Expostulation has been favorably responded to by only four. Of these, two have also written themselves down "Englishmen first, Catholics

afterwards," thus exceeding in their obsequious liberality the demand that had been made on them, and demonstrating of what value their opinions are on the Vatican Decrees, or indeed on any religious subject. A third has made a calumnious, and, from a Catholic point of view, blasphemous charge against a canonized Pope, and has signally failed in substantiating it. The fourth seems to be in possession of that "dangerous thing, a little learning," which makes him imagine that he alone of all men living understands the Decree of the Vatican Council on Papal Infallibility.

Four is not a large number of seceders for the Roman Catholic population of Great Britain and Ireland. The gain to Mr. Gladstone is not great, neither is the loss to the Church worth attending to, all things considered. As regards Catholics, therefore, the Expostulation is simply innocuous, and did not require an answer; but Mr. Gladstone's is a name that up to this has carried weight with his countrymen, and his assertions in the present instance are very daring, and his assumption of knowledge of Catholic matters very pretentious; and thousands of well-meaning men outside the Catholic Church will accept his statements at sight, and will believe things about her that are not true and that are calculated to disparage her, and their verdict will be against her, unless they have an opportunity of hearing apologists in her behalf. The present writer has an additional reason, in some sense a personal one, for not allowing the Expostulation to pass without a comment. A good many years of his life were spent

in the study and in the teaching of Theology, and it is not easy to remain silent, and hear the science that one loved and was proud of, mistaken and misrepresented as Catholic Theology is in this Expostulation by Mr. Gladstone.

In some of the replies already given, as it appears to me, a mistake has been made. It has been supposed that the only, or, at least, the main question at issue, was that of Allegiance, as affected by the Vatican Decrees, and into this supposition one is naturally led by the title of the pamphlet. To accept this view is to miss the main gist of Mr. Gladstone's composition, which is, not to elicit in a friendly way from Catholics an avowal of their undisturbed allegiance under the Vatican Decrees, but to exhibit the Church of Rome as arrogant in her claims, dishonest in her policy, shallow and ignorant in her teaching—in fact, an effete institution which no modern State can tolerate within its realm with any degree of security to itself. To explain satisfactorily the allegiance of Catholics at present, would be, borrowing the word from Mr. Gladstone himself, to blunt only one of the many “fangs” he has whetted for his attack upon the Church.

The plan of reply which I have decided on adopting is to follow the writer closely through the many and varied details of the Expostulation—not an easy task—and to deal with its principal assertions and arguments *seriatim* and *sigillatim*. On this account I have called my attempt a “Few Comments on the Expostulation.”

PRELIMINARY.

In limine, as we sometimes say in the schools, on the very threshold, before we enter into the house of contention, it will be well to define our relative positions with accuracy, lest we should hereafter, as is usual with controversialists, find ourselves in the condition of adversaries encountering in the dark, dealing out blows at random, and coming into actual collision only by accident.

Mr. Gladstone has cited the Church of Rome into court—the court of public opinion—and has made certain grave charges against her, and called upon her for her defence. He is the accuser, she is the accused ; he is bound to supply proof of what he charges her with, not conjecture, not suspicion, but proof ; she is bound only to explanation. Again, from the title of his work, and from the fact of its being addressed to Roman Catholics, the proofs he supplies must be such as ought to be conclusive with Roman Catholics. It will not do to start from a Protestant, or rationalistic, or other not admitted principle, and end in a conclusion which Catholics are called on to accept. Mr. Gladstone has not the privilege of being allowed to “beg the question” any more than another controversialist. Finally, if a proposition—I speak chiefly of main propositions—be susceptible of various meanings, I am bound to recognise that meaning alone which is established by argument, not any different or more comprehensive one that may possibly be in the mind of the author.

This will appear to some too formal a manner of treating the Expostulation, and I shall, perhaps, be charged with adhering too stiffly to the rules of logical interpretation. But how else is a writer of Mr. Gladstone's discursive and irregular habits of arguing to be kept on the track? He does not argue from broad and admitted principles, but, for the most part, from views peculiar to himself—views, I will add, that are not the outcome of calm and dispassionate reason, but the inspirings of intense bitterness of feeling and strong dislike. His own mind is at once the source and the reason of his conclusions.

DIVISION OF SUBJECT.

Mr. Gladstone sets out by dividing his Expostulation into three parts. The first inquires if the allegations made in the "Contemporary Review" of October, 1874, are true? The second, if they are for any practical purpose material? And the third, if they are suitable to be set forth by Mr. Gladstone? And he undertakes to establish an affirmative answer for all three. This way of going to work is promising, whatever may come of it afterwards.

Before entering into the regular treatment of his questions, he thinks it necessary to make an observation on the manner in which his words in the article of the "Contemporary" were taken up by his Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen. He fears they have given "deep offence," at which he seems rather surprised, as he does

also at their being “treated as an attack made upon Catholics generally, nay, as an insult offered them,” whereas Mr. Gladstone continues: “It is obvious to reply that of Roman Catholics generally they state nothing.” Just so. To declare of Roman Catholics generally that their civil allegiance and loyalty is, if not unsound, at least questionable and precarious—to assert that the tenets which they hold can be accepted only with the forfeiture of mental and moral freedom—that history and modern thought alike protest against the absurdity of the doctrine which they profess in the face of the world—all this is “*obviously*” to say nothing of them! Of a certainty Mr. Gladstone is not serious.

He has not yet done with preliminary remarks, and after sympathizing with quiet-minded Roman Catholics, whoever they may be, he passes on to a comparison of the conduct of the Roman Catholic Church and that of “Orientals, Lutherans, Calvinists,” &c., and makes some extraordinary statements by implication.

“All other Christian bodies are content with freedom in their own domain.” That is, Roman Catholics are not. Happy people “all other Christian bodies,” to be allowed freedom within their own domain, whilst the freedom we find associated with the Roman Catholic Church to-day is the freedom which is *taken with her* of despoiling her in Italy, of fining and imprisoning her in Germany and Switzerland, and of calumniating her in England. If they would but leave us our own domain we would be very content.

“Orientals, Lutherans, &c., one and all in the pre-

sent day, contentedly and thankfully accept the benefits of civil order," which means—Roman Catholics do not.

Rather, Roman Catholics receive contentedly what they get of them, but in a good many countries of Europe at present they have not many to be thankful for.

"They never pretend that the State is not its own master." Those Roman Catholics do, must be the inference. What audacious fellows are those Roman Catholics ! Perhaps Mr. Gladstone means that they pretend that the State is not the master of somebody else, *videlicet*, of the Church. Yes, they do pretend that.

"They make no religious claims to temporal possessions or advantages." And Catholics do make such claims. When and where ? I may assume that Mr. Gladstone here refers to the Pope. But the Pope's claim to temporal possessions does not happen to be a religious one—it happens to be the oldest legitimate claim to temporal possessions that is in existence.

He endeavours, after all this, to make it up with "the mass of Roman Catholics individually," by saddling his charges on the "leaders of their Church ;" but it will not do. Roman Catholics individually are one with their Church and its leaders, and they will not accept as a compliment to them what is meant as an insult to her.

A quotation from Archbishop Manning comes next, which is evidently distorted from the meaning it had in its author's context to something very different. Dr.

Manning simply asserts that the Roman Church is the only one that is not the *slave* of "the civil governors of the world." Mr. Gladstone will have him to say that the Roman Church claims to be the *master* of "the civil governors of the world."

We have, after this—"The Rome of the middle ages claimed universal monarchy. The modern Church of Rome has abandoned nothing, has retracted nothing." Therefore, we conclude, the modern Church of Rome claims universal monarchy!!! But Mr. Gladstone proceeds—"Is that all? Far from it." But what is far beyond "universal monarchy" he does not let us know clearly. He speaks of some "brisk, vigorous, and constant opposition to those outrageous claims," which always kept "its orthodoxy and caused itself to be respected, and sometimes gained the upper hand," being now "put out of court" by the Vatican Decrees. No bill of particulars being handed in, the names of the opposition party or its leaders, time and country in which the opposition took place, not being supplied by Mr. Gladstone in a statement of so much importance, I must object to be driven to conjecture, and have only to meet a broad assertion by as broad a denial.

At length we have arrived at the Thesis.

"My propositions are these :

1. "That Rome has substituted for the proud boast of 'semper eadem,' a policy of violence and change in faith.

2. "That she has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused.

3. "That no one can now become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another.

4. "That she (Rome) has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history."

In his argument or explanation, Mr. Gladstone takes the first and fourth propositions together, and wishes "to dispose of them summarily." I shall find it necessary to take them separately, and I fear I shall not be able "to dispose of them summarily." They are really, the first in particular, the most important matter in the controversy, for the second has little meaning except in connexion with the fourth, and if the first be false, the third cannot be in its principal assertion true.

The first proposition, as its author says, refers to a fact, namely, that Roman Catholics were in the habit of boasting that its doctrine was "*semper eadem*," always the same. I find it difficult to suppose that Mr. Gladstone implies that the identity in faith claimed by Catholics for their Church was such as to exclude new definitions. Yet this must be his meaning. It is evident from his words he speaks of Roman controversialists arguing from "*the unbroken and absolute identity in belief in the Roman Church from the times of our Saviour.*" It is evident from the office which he assigns to the Church as in keeping with this "absolute identity in belief" which is "principally that of witness to facts," not "judge of doctrine," so that "her processes are subject to a constant challenge and appeal to history." It is evident from his scope, which is to show that "this

perilous Pontificate" had no right to make the two definitions of the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility. It is evident from his argument, which undertakes to establish that the Church of Rome has given up of late that "identity in belief," which she formerly boasted of as being peculiar to her. If new definitions of faith were admissible under the old system as well as under the new, she has given up nothing—she has made no change. We are curious to see the "Roman Catholic controversialist" who gives this notion of the "identity of belief" of his Church, or who has excluded "a living authority" from its teachings. The thing is simply incompatible with the membership of the Catholic Church.

Mr. Gladstone now passes on from the "fact" to "the opinion," and, as if some thick curtain had dropped between him and what he has just said "of absolute identity in belief," of the Church being a "witness to facts" and not "a judge of doctrine," of the introduction of the idea of "a living authority" being an innovation made within the last forty years, he speaks "of the ancient definitions of the Church," and with approval; he does not hesitate to make mention of the definitions of the Council of Trent itself, and to excuse them to some extent. Yet the matter of all those definitions, old as well as new, is *doctrine* and not "fact," and the authority defining them assumed itself to be a "judge of doctrine" and not a mere "witness to facts," and was believed to be such at all times by all members of the Roman Catholic Church.

Can Mr. Gladstone have been ignorant of this? And if not ignorant, with what sort of faith did he use the expressions already given in his remarks upon what he styles a "fact"?

THE CHURCH AND HER IDENTITY OF FAITH.

Misstatements call for full statements, and I hope I shall be excused by my reader if I go into this matter of the "identity in belief" in the Catholic Church with some fulness, in order to explain in what sense it is held by Catholics to be "semper" and even "ubique eadem," always and everywhere *one* and the *same*. I shall give our system as briefly and as clearly as I can.

We begin by deducing from the words of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Ephesians, chap. iv. ver. 5: "One Lord, one *faith*, one baptism," that the Church of Christ is essentially *one in faith*. From the same source (Epistle to Galatians, chap. i. ver. 8), we infer that this faith is something so stable, so fixed, that it is not to be put aside for another belief, although Paul himself, or even an angel from heaven, were to attempt the substitution. We conclude that this faith, one and fixed, is identical with the "deposit" of which the same Apostle speaks so solicitously in both his Epistles to St. Timothy: "O Timothee depositum custodi." We identify this "faith" or "deposit" with the object of our Saviour's commission, when he authorizes and commands his Apostles to "go and

teach all nations—teaching them to observe whatever I have commanded you.”—Matt. xxvi. We note particularly that He does not say *some of those things*, but “all whatsoever.” We advert to the use of the same word “*all truth*” in the discourse of Christ in the 16th chapter of St. John’s Gospel, as also to His words in 14th chapter and 26th verse, which are identical in meaning with those of the commission—“The Paraclete will teach you all things and bring all things to your mind, whatsoever I shall have said to you.” The object spoken of in all these passages we call the “*corpus doctrinæ*,” or aggregate of the teachings of Christ, and in respect of its being given in trust to the Apostles, we call it the “*depositum fidei*” —“deposit of faith.” This “*corpus doctrinæ*” we hold to have come perfect and complete from the hands of Christ, and not to have been increased by any new revelation since. The *depositio*, or placing of this body of doctrine in the charge of the Church, we believe to have been finally made and secured when the Holy Spirit descended upon the Apostles at Pentecost. We believe that the commission to teach was not given to the Apostles so as to expire with them, but so as to be continued in some form of succession, because He said: “And behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world,” and we call the persons that constitute the succession the *Ecclesia docens*, and we claim for this *Ecclesia docens*—

1. That it holds in its charge the “*corpus doctrinæ*”—in other words, that the “*depositum fidei*” is with it.

2. That it has authority to teach every truth contained in the deposit.

3. That Christ, through the Spirit of Truth, is always assisting at its teaching, so that it cannot err.

4. That its charge or commission has no limit of duration but the end of time. This is our system of the Church—a most consistent, most reasonable one—two things only being assumed, that Christ is the Truth, and that we have His words.

A teaching body implies a body to be taught, and hence we have an *Ecclesia audiens* hearing what the Teaching Church addresses to it. “If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican.”—Matt. xviii. 17. We have both bodies here indicated, with their relative duties and obligations.

The *Ecclesia audiens* is bound to hear, that is, to believe internally and profess externally what the *Ecclesia docens* has proposed as necessary to be believed and professed. Secondly, she must be prepared to believe and profess whatever the *Ecclesia docens* may hereafter propose as in the same manner necessary. By the first act of obedience identity in explicit faith, and by the second identity in implicit faith, is at once secured for all the members of the Church, from the first to the last, from the highest to the lowest, in all places and at all times. Thus, through their faith in its

custodian, they become believers in the whole body of truth revealed by Christ.

This *Ecclesia docens*, in the fulfilment of its divine commission, finds it necessary or useful, from time to time, to use its privilege of teaching some truth that is contained in the "depositum fidei," but which has not been hitherto proposed to the *Ecclesia audiens* as a matter of necessary belief. This we call a new definition—a defining of the truth as revealed by Christ. The reasons that actuate the Church to make new definitions of faith are not subjects for our criticism. There is only One responsible for her proceedings—He who promised to be with her to the end of time. But a new definition being made and proposed to the universal Church, the part of the *Ecclesia audiens* is to believe. Before the definition we are free to argue, to discuss, to hold the negative or the affirmative—once the *Ecclesia docens* has spoken, opinion gives way to faith, divisions of judgment cease, and unity prevails. This, and no other, is the identity in faith of the Catholic Church.

In the definition of Papal Infallibility in the Vatican Council there was no departure, not the slightest, from the ordinary and regular process of defining. Infallibility in teaching was always believed to be the privilege of the *Ecclesia docens*. The head of the *Ecclesia docens* was admitted to be the Pope. Regularly, no dogmatic teaching could be addressed to the universal Church unless it emanated from the Pope. No Council, however general in its number of assist-

ing Bishops, and regular in its proceedings, was accepted as definitive and binding until it had received the confirmation of the Pope. All this was, at all times, of universal admission amongst Catholics. On one point they were divided, or, more correctly speaking, for a time a difference of opinion existed as to the binding and definitive force of Pontifical Decrees or judgments without, or before, they had received the consent of the Bishops. The Gallican opinion—so called because it was held by many of the French Theologians—was, that the decrees of the Pontiff were not final and irreformable of themselves, but that they became such when the assent, tacit or express, of the Bishops was given to them. The Ultramontanes, as they are usually designated, taught, on the contrary, that the Pope's authority to teach the doctrine of Christ without error came to him through St. Peter, and was completely independent of the assent or dissent of the Bishops of the Church. It is late now to discuss the comparative merits of the two theses; one remark, however, will not be out of place—the opinion prevailing throughout the Church, and the one according to which the Church *worked*, was that of the Ultramontane school. Errors in faith and morals were condemned, doubtful questions were settled—in one word, the entire teaching function of the Church proceeded on the principle of Papal Infallibility. It will be sufficient to cite two remarkable instances: one, from an early period of the Church's history—the other, nearer to our own times—of leading errors that

received their “quietus” in this manner—that of Pelagianism, which denied the necessity of divine grace, which was condemned by Innocent I.; and that of Jansenism, which taught that some of God’s precepts were impossible of fulfilment, and that Christ did not die for all men—which was condemned by Innocent X.

The definition of Infallibility in the Vatican Council did not, therefore, make any practical change in the mode of teaching always in use in the Church, nor was it a change in faith and falsification of the Catholic theory of “*semper eadem*,” for she does not substitute the doctrine of Papal Infallibility for the *doctrine* of Papal Fallibility—that would be a change in faith; but she makes Papal Infallibility, which had been always a matter of implicit faith, henceforth a matter of explicit faith, and renders the *opinion* of Papal Fallibility no longer tenable. It is the same thing that she did for other doctrines in the Council of Trent, or in any of the Œcumenical Councils from the beginning.

We may now resume our parley with Mr. Gladstone. He tells us that Rome has not only changed her faith, but has adopted a “policy of violence.” Policy of violence! How like a grim joke this sounds! The violence of Pio Nono, plundered and imprisoned, with the cry of the assassins, “*morte a’l Papa*,” ascending to his chambers, while Mr. Gladstone’s friends stand by passive and uninterfering. Something like this was said a good many years ago in the hall of

Annas, when the servant made it out that Jesus was insulting the high priest, and for it smote Him on the face.

“A policy of violence” is toned down further on to the “aiming of deadly blows” at some imaginary school of Theology, but the stronger and more natural sense of the phrase is re-asserted, when the Pope is charged with claiming, in “the substance of the Propositions” of the Syllabus, the right of “inflicting penalty of life, limb, liberty, goods, the title to depose sovereigns,” &c.

We are now in a position to examine the theory of the Church of which our author seems to approve, and to compare it with the other theory which has been supplied to us out of the teachings of the New Testament.

“Go and teach all nations,” said Christ, and “I will send you the Spirit of Truth to teach you all truth.” “Go,” propounds Mr. Gladstone, “and have nothing to do with the *judging of doctrine*, but bear witness to *facts*, and be very particular to keep square with history.” The spirit of history—and such history as we have in these countries for the Spirit of Truth—“not Jesus, but Barrabas.” He goes on: “Recent decrees are at war with modern thought, and involve a violent breach with history.” “Modern thought!” Here we have another check upon the Church of Christ to keep her straight in her teaching, but, as it will appear in another portion of the Expostulation when the Syllabus comes under discussion, we shall put off our observation on it for the present.

“Violent breach with history !” What a worshipper of history is Mr. Gladstone ! “Violent breach with history !” How often is a sounding phrase that strikes well on the ear discovered to be hollow and empty when it is tested for meaning ? Pray, what is there so sacred, so inviolable in history, that we are not to break with it ? The world is perpetually breaking with history, and why not the Church if it be desirable, and involve no infringement of her constitution ? Socially, politically, scientifically, we are every day breaking with history. There is nothing in the phrase, Mr. Gladstone, not even when wrapped up in its robe of vagueness.

Meantime, I am very far from admitting that the Church has the slightest quarrel with history, much less a “violent breach” in her “enlargement of the necessary creed of Christendom” by new definitions of faith. This is a process that history is quite familiar with. In Councils and out of Councils, the Church has been enlarging the necessary faith of Christendom in every age of its existence from Peter to Pius, and unless the affairs of this world are wound up more speedily than we have an idea of at present, she will continue to enlarge it in the ages to come. Our author does not seem to approve of this ever-increasing demand on our faith. He thinks the thing should have stopped fifteen hundred years ago, and up to that it seems to have his approval. He is one of those who, in virtue of a self-assumed commission, think themselves entitled to sit in judgment on the Church of Christ, in order to inquire into the manner in

which she has conducted herself since her institution. They generally find that "for the first three centuries of her existence she got on tolerably well—after that time, she has not been so satisfactory." This appears to be Mr. Gladstone's finding also.

The circumstances under which the Church was justified in making those "ancient definitions," and which, by a stretch, are extended to the Council of Trent, are that "they sprang from and related to theories rampant at the time, and regarded as menacing to Christian belief." But in the Decrees of this perilous period he cannot discover a shadow of justification.

The Decrees alluded to are those of the Immaculate Conception and of Papal Infallibility, and in referring to the former he has the bad taste to use a word which he knows to be insulting to Catholics and inapplicable to their doctrine; for he knows that "*latreia*" means the worship due to God alone, which he also knows that Catholics do not give to the Blessed Virgin Mary. We Catholics are accustomed to this sort of treatment, but we are not accustomed to receive it from men of Mr. Gladstone's acquirements and position.

But omitting this, and accepting, for experiment sake, his view of the circumstances that justify the Church in proceeding to definition, there are not to be found in the history of Christianity, cases more completely justifiable than those he has had the infelicity to select. Never were theories more rampant than those directed by men, calling themselves Chris-

tians, against the dignity of the Mother of God and the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff in our own times. The entire Christianity of countless numbers of men appeared to consist of unceasing efforts to degrade the one and to insult the other. Against these—not simple menaces, but open outrages on Christian belief, even merely historically considered—it became necessary for the Church, in the defence of Catholic truth, to raise her voice, and to command her children, under the sanction of her infallible teaching, to profess before men the complete and perfect sinlessness of Mary, the Mother of God, and the unerring authority of the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ.

Mr. Gladstone has, however, further objection to these two definitions, for that they “aim deadly blows at the old, historic, scientific, and moderate school,” we presume of Theology. I have been hearing of Catholic Theological schools since I first took an Ethic treatise in my hands, some thirty years ago; but the “old, historic, scientific, and moderate school” is not amongst them. There are the Scotists and the Thomists, the Gallican and the Ultramontane; and, in the matter of grace, the Augustinians, and the Molinists, and the Congruists, and in Moral Theology, the Rigorists and the Probabilists, and so on; but the “old, historic, scientific, and moderate?”—No; “non est inventa.” Mr. Gladstone must have mistaken some other establishment for the Church when he was making the acquaintance of this many-titled school. History and science are not the sources from which Catholic schools of Theology derive their prin-

ciples and gather their conclusions, but the word of God, the decrees of Councils and of Pontiffs, and the teachings of the Fathers. History and science do come in at times, but in their proper capacity, the one to exemplify, the other to illustrate. If, however, we were to admit that they were fair and sufficient grounds for determining the judgment of the Church in the defining of a doctrine, Mr. Gladstone would find that he had again made a most unsuccessful guess in his selection of the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility as instances of definitions made in the teeth of history or of science.

For the first. We have from the earliest ages of Christianity the most abundant, and distinct, and emphatic evidences of Christian belief in favour of the exemption of the Blessed Virgin from all taint of sin. A large volume, embodying the principal amongst them, was published under the direction of Father Passaglia at the time of the Definition, out of which any one curious on the matter can solve for himself the question—whether the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary is anti-historic?

Neither is it opposed to science, the science proper to such a subject. For, assuming the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God, with Mary for his mother, for the purpose of man's redemption from sin, her Immaculate Conception comes out as an inevitable consequence.

For the second. With the exception of the Gallican

period, we have in the whole history of the Church no appeal against the Infallibility of the Pope, although he was uniformly teaching the Church from the very beginning according to that doctrine. Nor, indeed, did the Gallican appeal avail much; for throughout the entire duration of Gallicanism, from the days of Gerson to the Vatican Council, however strong the talk it held in the schools, it was never able, with all its State influence behind it, to cancel or reform a single *ex cathedra* judgment or decree issued by the Pontiff to the Church Universal. So much for its relation to history.

Still less is it unscientific, for antecedently to, and independently of the definition of the Vatican Council, we Catholics always held, as of faith, two principles, which without it would work very badly together. We held for the universal Church inerrancy in belief, and for the Pope, in virtue of his primacy, the right of teaching that universal Church. A fallible authority would be but a poor teacher for a Church that could not err. It may be that Mr. Gladstone does not mean by history, when he uses the term in his *Expostulation*, the written testimony of competent witnesses as to facts, but something else, and that not mental science or reason as applicable to spiritual things, but social, or political, or some other science is floating before his mind when he uses the word "scientific." But as he did not condescend to enlighten us on his meaning, we had nothing for it but to deal with the expressions in their usual

signification, or in the one indicated by the nature of the subject in hand.

At this place our author brings into his argument the name of Dr. Newman—a name of respect alike with those from whom he has gone out, and those amongst whom he has taken his place—brings it in ungraciously, because uselessly for his purpose. He makes no point by its introduction. It is mentioned indeed complimentarily. Dr. Newman is styled “the first living Theologian now within the Roman Catholic communion,” a matter on which Mr. Gladstone is of course most competent to pronounce an opinion. The compliment becomes very questionable a few pages on, when it is divided with another, a friend of Mr. Gladstone’s. Such as it is, however, it is paid in the present instance rather for the purpose of strengthening his own position, than to exalt Dr. Newman.

“With this censure the proceeding of 1870 has actually been visited by the first living Theologian,” &c. Now, “the proceeding of 1870,” of which he has been speaking, which “aimed deadly blows at the old, historic, &c., school,” and which is called “an act of violence,” is the definition of Papal Infallibility, and was visited with no censure by Dr. Newman, but was, on the contrary, received by him with the docility of a true child of the Church. The words quoted are the words of Dr. Newman, writing his private views in a private letter, not on the question of Papal Infallibility, which I believe he held ever since he was a Catholic, but on an agitation that was *said* to be on

foot at the time, to force the discussion of the question upon the Council. To this, and not to the "proceeding of 1870," the passage refers. The date of the Doctor's letter is April 6th—the date of the "proceeding" was July 18th. Mr. Gladstone gives us the first—was he possibly ignorant of the second?

SECOND PROPOSITION.

"Rome has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused." And we are promised proof. Better not to expect too much—our author is not strong at proof. Possible contingencies, vague analogies, egoistical views, go a great way towards a conclusion in his system of reasoning. The "rusty tools" mean the censures which the Church pronounces against men or on doctrines. The designation is a polite one, and of course quite becoming in the mouth of a Christian gentleman. We shall have a few other equally polite expressions to deal with before we close.

Meantime the Church of Rome has not refurbished and paraded anew any tools, "rusty" or otherwise. The spiritual arms which her Founder empowered her to use against erring subjects, or in the defence of her charge, have, unfortunately, never had time to grow rusty, even if their origin had left them susceptible of decay. Errors in doctrine and immoral teachings are cropping up in every age, alluring away the children of the Church from obedience or from duty, and it be-

comes incumbent on their Mother to be vigilant, to warn, to admonish, to correct, and, if necessary, to punish. The commission to "go and teach all nations," is as fully in force to-day as when it was spoken by the Founder of Christianity eighteen hundred years ago ; it commands the truth to be proclaimed as openly in this age as it did in that ; it can no more admit of compromise with error, by silence or by connivance, now than it did then, and it has its sanction of spiritual penalties as well now as it had when St. Paul "handed over to Satan" Hymonæus and Alexander, for "shipwreck in faith," and the Corinthian for a scandalous violation of Christian morality. Conscious that this commission abides with her, the Church of Rome has never ceased to act up to its requirements, and Mr. Gladstone's "refurbishing and parading anew" of her spiritual arms is nothing more than a piece of empty and insolent rhetoric.

We arrive now at the proof, or what we have to be content with in place of proof—a list of Eighteen Propositions said to be condemned by the Holy See. Mr. Gladstone does not wish "to import passion" into the controversy by citing "the fearfully energetic epithets in which the condemnations are sometimes clothed." One cannot help regretting that this spirit of charity and moderation did not attend him through the whole of the Expostulation, and restrain him from using epithets himself which he knows to be most insulting to Catholics.

Before dealing with the Propositions in detail, it will be well to explain to such of our readers as are not skilled in Catholic Theology the manner of proceeding usual with the Holy See in the condemnation of Propositions, and the amount of doctrinal teaching conveyed when a Proposition is condemned. The error with which the Pontiff proposes to deal, if not found expressed *nettement* by its author, is couched in the briefest and most simple language that can express it, and the sentence or proposition so composed is declared *false* and *blasphemous*, or *heretical*, or in whatever other opposition they are judged to be to Christian truth. Every condemned Proposition is declared at least *false*, and by the fact, its opposite, or, to speak more strictly, its contradictory, is declared true. But this declaration affects the proposition exactly as it stands, *with every word carrying its meaning, and every qualifying clause taken into account*. The Eighteen Propositions are selected out of eighty that are contained in the Syllabus, and are, we may presume, not taken at random, but are chosen carefully as representative of Catholic teaching. When a trader undertakes to supply a sample of any commodity, he is held bound by the plain laws of honesty to make it such that the quality of the stock from which it is taken may be fairly estimated from it. If he corrupt it to the extent of removing from it something that is found in it, or adding something that is not found, so as to influence the judgment of the purchaser, he exposes himself to the penalty of voidance of his contract

and of loss of his character. Mr. Gladstone supplies us with these Eighteen Propositions as samples from which we are to form our opinion of modern Catholic teaching. He can have no objection, then, to our looking well into them, lest they might have been corrupted by addition or omission. His motives or intentions in any change or corruption of the Propositions I shall avoid alluding to as much as possible. Sometimes, however, it will be scarcely possible to omit a passing remark.

So much attention has been drawn to the Syllabus of late, and so many wrong notions about it appear to be in circulation, that before entering on the direct examination of the Eighteen Propositions it may be well to state briefly what is the exact truth about the Syllabus, and what place it holds in Catholic teaching.

On the 8th December, 1864, His Holiness Pius IX. issued an Encyclical (or circular) Epistle addressed to his "Venerable Brothers, all the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, in the favor and communion of the Apostolic See," in which he refers in general terms to "the principal errors of our time, which he had condemned in previous Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters." He then engages their pastoral solicitude against "other impious opinions, flowing from the same errors as so many fountains," of which he makes mention, and expressly condemns them. His words are: "We, by our Apostolic authority, reprobate, proscribe, and condemn all and every the impious opinions and doctrines in these present Letters

commemorated." These are "the fearfully energetic epithets" which Mr. Gladstone would not mention for fear of "importing passion" into the controversy.

Conjointly with this Encyclical, the Syllabus of eighty Propositions was also issued, but without any special additional sanction. The title is: "A Syllabus containing the principal Errors of our time, which are noted in the Consistorial Allocutions, Encyclical and other Apostolic Letters of our Most Holy Father Pius the Ninth."

The eighty Propositions are divided into classes under the heads of the different errors they belong to. Thus, the first class is headed, "Pantheism, Naturalism, Absolute Rationalism," and five Propositions are given. The second is "Moderate Rationalism," comprehended in seven Propositions. The third is Indifferentism; the fourth, Socialism and Communism; then Errors concerning the Church, Errors concerning Civil Society, and so on.

Each Proposition is given in the form in which it asserts the error, without negation or further qualification of it than that which is contained in the reference to the Papal Allocution or Letter in which it received its condemnation. For instance: the second Proposition, under the head of Pantheism, Naturalism, &c., is—"All action of God on men or on the universe is to be denied." And no other remark, except the insertion under it, of "Alloc. Maxima quidem, 9 Junii, 1862." The words are those with which the Allocution commences.

It is now easy to fix the authoritative character of the condemnation of the Propositions of the Syllabus. It is for each Proposition exactly that which is found recorded against it in the Letter or Allocution to which we are referred. The fact of setting them in order, classifying them, issuing them to the Bishops of the Church, together with the Encyclical, is an indication of the Pope's wish that they should be attended to by the Bishops, and that the members of their flocks should be warned of their erroneous and dangerous nature wherever it may become necessary to do so ; but it does not impart to them any additional condemnation or qualification. In fine, we are bound to hold about them all that they are *false*, because it is styled a Syllabus of *errors*, and because they are declared to have been *condemned* in Papal Letters or Allocutions. We are bound to hold about each what is taught concerning it in the particular Letter or Allocution to which we are referred, according to the teaching authority of that Letter or Allocution.

MR. GLADSTONE'S PROOF FROM THE EIGHTEEN
PROPOSITIONS.

I have struck upon a plan for the examination of this proof, which I think ought to be satisfactory to all parties concerned. I propose, as far as is feasible, to give a conspectus of the Propositions as given by Mr. Gladstone, and as given by the Pope, at once, so that the reader may be able to see at a glance if any and what change has been introduced. I will ask him, then, to read first without the paren-

theses, and he will have Mr. Gladstone—with the parentheses, and he will have the Pope.

First, Second, and Third Propositions in one.

“Those who maintain the (unbridled) liberty of the Press ; the (irresponsible) liberty of conscience and of forms of worship ; the (completely unrestricted) liberty of speech, are condemned (as holding erroneous opinions greatly detrimental to the Catholic Church, and to the safety of souls.”) I feel myself bound only to show that the parentheses left out by Mr. Gladstone were really inserted by the Pope. I leave the rest to the reader. I quote from the text of the Encyclicals given by Mr. Gladstone. Pope Gregory the Sixteenth and Pope Pius the Ninth are of one mind as to the un-Catholic and dangerous tendency of certain theories, to wit : “That liberty of conscience, and of forms of worship, is an inherent right of every man, which ought to be proclaimed by law, and asserted in every well constituted society, and that the most unlimited liberty to manifest and declare openly and publicly, by speech, or through the press, or in any other way, any notions they please, independently of all authority, civil or ecclesiastical, is a right existing in every citizen.” Set aside this teaching, if you think fit, Mr. Gladstone, but then, for consistency sake, if you are Premier again, abolish all laws against libel, blasphemy, treason ; give a *carte blanche* to the Mormons, White Quakers, Shakers, Peculiar People ; place restrictions on your police, lest they should in their zeal interfere with the *liberty*

of the vendors of bad books or immodest pictures ; shorten the hand of your Lord Chamberlain, and allow the theatres of London to vie with, or surpass, the worst stage exhibitions to be seen in the Continental capitals—*Vive la Liberte!* What could have induced Mr. Gladstone to meddle in this Papal Encyclical at all is not so easy to discover. The teaching is directed against those excesses of liberty *only* in their relation to the *Catholic Church* and to the *salvation of souls*. It declares them greatly detrimental to both. How was he concerned, if Catholic interests were to suffer by them?—or, could it have been the safety of souls that so aroused his vigilance, and provoked his indignation?

Proposition Four condemns those “who contend that Papal Judgments and Decrees (having for their declared object the general good of the Church, and its laws and discipline) may, without sin (and any departure from *Catholic profession*), be disobeyed or differed from, unless they treat of the rules (dogmas) of faith and morals.”

A dogma is not a rule, but a doctrine of faith. But this is not much. By the omission of the first parenthesis the Pope would be made to claim *unlimited* obedience, under pain of sin, even outside the domain of faith and morals. By its insertion this claim is limited to matters affecting the “general good of the Church, its laws and its discipline.” By the omission of the second parenthesis the Papal teaching is made to appear to be an instruction addressed to those

without as well as those within the Church. By its insertion it is clearly shown to be intended for the members of the Catholic communion. I do not know on what principle Mr. Gladstone justifies to himself this manner of dealing with the text of the Encyclical. We call it, in our theological language, “*suppressio veri, et suggestio falsi*”—suppression of the truth, and suggestion of what is false. And with us its effect is to destroy at once the force of the argument in which it is used, and the character for fairness of the persons using it.

Proposition Five, as given by Mr. Gladstone, is such a truncated edition of the Pontiff's words, that I cannot fill them into it in any shape. I must give both Propositions in their integrity.

Mr. Gladstone's:—“Those are condemned who assign to the State the power of defining the *civil* rights (*jura*) and province of the Church.”

The Pope's:—“Those are condemned who assert that the Church is not a real, and perfect, and independent community, and that she was not furnished by her Divine Founder with permanent rights of her own, but that it belongs to the civil power to define the rights of the Church and the limits of the exercise of these rights.”

Is this sheer ignorance on our author's part, or is it something else that one does not wish to name? Whence did he obtain the interpolated word “*civil*”? Not from the text of the Syllabus, for the rights there spoken of are those derived from the Divine Founder of

the Church. Why did he suppress the other words of the passage which would show that "jura" could not mean "civil rights"? Why did he not give the passage in full (it was not so very long), and let his reader understand the nature of the doctrine which the Pope was condemning, namely, that it denied to the Church the organization or the privileges of a perfect society, and left it, with its divine origin and precious charge, a mere puppet in the hands of the State?

Proposition Six condemns "Those who hold that Roman Pontiffs and Œcumenical Councils have transgressed the limits of their power and usurped the rights of princes (and erred in matters of faith and morals)." The reader is here instructed in a note that "Œcumenical means a *Roman* Council not recognised by the rest of the Church." Œcumenical (see Dictionaries *passim*) means the inhabited world, and an Œcumenical Council means a General Council or Council of the *Universal* Church, with the Pontiff *presiding* or *confirming*. Mr. Gladstone may limit the number of them to suit his own views, but let him not corrupt the meaning of the word. He might have said a Council of the *Roman Catholic Church*, if he did not wish to lead his readers astray. Of the eighteen Œcumenical Councils enumerated by our writers before the Vatican, *four* only were Roman Councils, eight were celebrated in the East, the other six in different parts of the Western Church.

What the Pontiff condemns in the passage under consideration is a sweeping charge made against the *Ecclesia docens* generally, that it had failed in every respect. The portion of it that attributes to Popes and to Councils the usurpation of the rights of princes is simply denied by Pio Nono, as it is also by many of the most careful investigators of the cases alleged. We shall, probably, have occasion to recur to this subject again.

Proposition Seven is condemned for denying "to the Church all right of employing force."

With Mr. Gladstone the right to employ force is inalienable from the civil power. But it does not take much reflection to discover that there exists in man a right of this sort, not derived from the civil power, though controllable by it in certain circumstances. For instance, a man has a right to defend by force his life, his property, in general anything placed under his protection, whenever they are made the objects of an unjust aggression. And this right is from God—the same source from which the trust itself is derived—and not from civil authority. This is the right of defence.

Again, a parent, a guardian, a teacher, in the enforcing of their directions or instructions, may employ force within the limits prescribed by prudence and humanity. This is the right of correction.

Both instances will be found applicable to the Church. From a very early date the Church began

to become the possessor of temporal goods. In the fourth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles we are told that "as many as were owners of lands or houses sold them, and brought the price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the Apostles." And in the sixth chapter we have seven Deacons set apart for the care and administration of those temporal matters in order that the Apostles may be free for "the ministry of the Word." But, unfortunately, "wherever the body shall be, there shall the eagles be gathered together." Temporal possessions provoke cupidity in those who think that they ought to have them because they might have them, and hence the Church has been, in this matter of temporal trust, exposed at all times to the challenge of the rapacious—a challenge to which there never has been, and never can be, any other reply than the brief but emphatic "*non possumus*." St. Lawrence, the Roman Deacon, because he had no other way of saving the Church possessions of which he had charge, distributed them to the poor, for whose use, in some form or other, they were mainly intended, and then went cheerfully to his martyrdom of fire.

St. Lawrence had no way of defending his charge, and was driven to the next best course of conveying it all at once to its destination ; but when defence is practicable, it is not only lawful, but it is a duty for the Church, in the persons of its ministers, in whom the temporal trust is vested, to defend that trust by all modes that would be allowable to lay trustees in

analogous circumstances. I have, for instance, as full a right to defend the small stock of vestments or sacred utensils, that I have charge of for my Church at Monkstown, as any private gentleman has to defend his plate or his family jewels, and whatever *force* it is lawful for him to use for such an object, it is lawful for me also to use the same, as far as civil or natural law is concerned. The only restriction on me in the matter comes from my own ecclesiastical code, which will not allow its ordained minister, by himself, to use force to the shedding of blood, in this sort of defence. Ascending in the order of Church ministers, and contemplating a wider extent of temporal charge, it is lawful for the Primate of Hungary, or any other Prince Bishop, to defend, for their defined objects, the lands or holdings in his keeping, by all manner of defence that would be allowed to a temporal ruler of equal rank and position, by the laws or usages of the time and of the country. More complete still, and equitable, was the right, and as a consequence of the right, the duty of the Sovereign Pontiff, to defend his temporal possessions in the same way that any other monarch was entitled to defend his.

These principles are clear, and according to reason, and must commend themselves to all honest-minded men. The theory of a Church, patient and unresisting, at the same time that it is a holder of important temporal trusts which are invaded, is, on the contrary, silly and inappropriate ; but it is paraded abroad at present, as a convenient cover for what is

in great request in these days of ours—a plan of Church robbery made easy.

In the business of correction, the Church usually proceeds against erring or refractory members by the infliction of spiritual penalties, but there is no reason why she should not proceed by way of force—1, in countries under her own temporal rule, as in the States of the Church; 2, in countries subject to other temporal rulers, with their co-operation or consent. It is late now in the Church's history to strip her of her coercitive power. *Jure vel injuria*, she has been using it from the earliest period. The Fathers think it commenced with the denunciation of death against Ananias and Sapphira as a punishment of their crime. This much at least is plain, that if physical punishment was foreign to the spirit of the Church of Christ, it is highly improbable that it would have been supernaturally interposed at the very first formation of that Church into a community. St. Paul's mode of dealing with those who had made "shipwreck of the faith," and with the erring Corinthian, was coercitive to a serious degree, and it was, no doubt, after his or other Apostolic precedent, that the discipline of canonical penances, involving a large amount of physical restraint and punishment, was established. This discipline was the rule of the Church at the time when Mr. Gladstone allows that all went well with her—the first three or four centuries of her existence—and included as great a person as an Emperor amongst those who were called upon to observe it.

The reader must remember that we are all along dealing with the theory, for it is the theory that is spoken of in the condemned Proposition. The particular cases in which physical force is said to have been employed illegitimately must be individually investigated on their own data, but the principles to guide us in the investigation have been sufficiently laid down in what has been just said.

Proposition Eight is condemned for asserting "That (there is another temporal) power, not inherent in the office of the Episcopate, but granted to it by the civil authority, (which on that account) may be withdrawn from it, at the discretion of that authority." I must call the reader's attention to the corruption of the text and consequent change of sense. The Proposition considered by the Pope asserts that there *is* a distinct power conferred on the Episcopate by the civil authority. This is exactly what he denies. Mr. Gladstone assumes, as a matter in admission, that there is such a power given to the Episcopate by the civil authority, and then of course wonders why the lord that gave it may not also be the lord to take it away. The objects of Nuitz, the writer condemned by the Pontiff, and of Mr. Gladstone, are one and the same, to place the functions of the Episcopate at the mercy of the State—the power spoken of is the power of the Church over the Sacrament of Matrimony—but the one states his thesis openly to our face before he draws his conclusion; the other slurs over the thesis as not dis-

puted, and lays down the conclusion as a matter of course.

Proposition Nine asserts that “The *civil* immunity of the Church and its ministers (ecclesiastical persons) *depends upon civil right*,” version of Mr. Gladstone — “had its origin in civil law,” version of the Pope, who condemns the teaching as false. Are we to understand that Mr. Gladstone believes “*jus civile*” to mean “civil right,” and that “*ortum habuit*” is faithfully translated by the word “depends”? And if not, what are we to understand? The word “civil” is not in the original—for what purpose was it introduced, except to make a point with a superficial reader? It is very easy to get the better of your adversary on our author’s principle. Make his defences weak to order, and then demolish them—a most appropriate supplement to Captain Boabdil’s plan for the destruction of an enemy.

Proposition Ten asserts “That in the conflict of laws, civil and ecclesiastical, the civil law should prevail”; “does prevail” is the Pope’s version; but, “should” or “does,” the Pope will not have the Proposition. Did any one expect he would? There were some rather remarkable civil laws in conflict with the ecclesiastical, as well as with the divine, in the time of the Roman Emperors; but that is perhaps too long ago, and those Emperors were pagans. Well, there were some civil laws which Mr. Gladstone agrees to describe as “pettifogging, base, and cruel,” in force in

England and in Ireland under English rulers (and they were not pagans) in conflict with the ecclesiastical laws of the Catholic Church in these countries, and will Mr. Gladstone say that they ought to have prevailed?

This question of the relative pre-eminence of State and Church laws when in conflict is one about which, with rational men, there is no room for discussion. For those who believe in a God, His laws must prevail over the laws of men—for those who believe in a Church founded by God and commissioned by Him to teach His doctrine unerringly, the laws and ordinances of that stable and indefectible institution must be preferred to the shifty laws of ephemeral governments. There is neither reason nor common sense at the bottom of the theory that would subject the laws of God or of His Church to the laws of the State.

Proposition Eleven in the Expostulation runs thus:—
 “That any method of instruction of youth solely secular may be approved.” Even as stated by Mr. Gladstone, I think most Christian men of any denomination would object to the opinion. This is not, however, the Proposition condemned by the Pope. What he condemns is the assertion, “that a system of education of youth, unconnected with Catholic faith, and not under the direction of the Church, and having for its sole, or, at least, primary object, natural philosophy and social science, is deserving of the approbation of *Catholics*.” I think I may add, nor of Protestants.

Proposition Twelve is, “That knowledge of things

philosophical (and of morals) and civil (laws also) may and should decline to be guided by Divine and Ecclesiastical authority." "Decline to be guided" is a very free translation of the word in the Syllabus, "declinare," but we will not quarrel over trifles. If the knowledge spoken of "declines to be guided" by the *divine law*, the ecclesiastical law has no reason to be jealous. The error, which the Pope condemns, asserts that philosophy and jurisprudence should look away from, make no account of revelation or the teaching of the Church. Does Mr. Gladstone subscribe the doctrine?

Proposition Thirteen teaches—"That Matrimony is not in its essence a Sacrament," and we are referred to the Syllabus, Proposition sixty-six. What I find there is, however, something very different. It runs thus: "The Sacrament of Matrimony is only something accessory to the contract, and is separable from it. The Sacrament itself is nothing more than the nuptial benediction." This is erroneous: what the Church teaches about the "essence" of Matrimony is, that it is a contract instituted by God; that when this contract is entered into between Christians, it is, in addition, a Sacrament in virtue of the institution of Christ, and that the nuptial benediction is only an accompanying ceremony, an appendage of the Sacrament.

What objection has Mr. Gladstone that we Catholics should look upon Matrimony as a Sacrament, or that we should not repose its essence in the nuptial benediction? St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Ephesians,

calls it a "great Sacrament," one symbolizing Christ's union with His Church.

Proposition Fourteen lays down, in our author's text, "That marriage not sacramentally (*sic*) contracted has a binding force." The passage he refers to translates as follows : "The mere civil contract is sufficient to constitute real and rightly-styled Matrimony amongst Christians, and it is false to teach that the contract of Matrimony amongst Christians is always a Sacrament, or that the contract is made void by excluding the intention of receiving a Sacrament." What the Church teaches by the condemnation of the Proposition is, in the first place, that the mere *civil* contract is not the genuine Matrimony of Christians—a teaching it will be found difficult to set aside with the words of Christ before us : "What *God* hath united let *no man* separate." According to this the binding force of the contract comes from God, and man is to have nothing to do with it. This is rather hard upon the civil power.

Secondly, as she taught in her condemnation of the previous Proposition, the Sacrament and contract must go together, and if one be excluded so is the other. The Sacrament will not be there without the contract, nor the contract without the Sacrament.

Why does Catholic teaching on this subject so disturb Mr. Gladstone? Possibly from a Statesman's point of view he thinks it would be better to have Matrimony without this sacramental element mixed up in it, without anything of a sacred character at-

tached to it—a mere covenant between man and woman, made under State regulations, and determinable by State authority—and from this point of view it probably would. But the real question is, not what is the calculation of the Statesman, but what is the ordinance of God. If God willed Matrimony to be something more than the sort of contract which men make about a horse or about a farm, if he wished to make it a *solemn, sacred, and indissoluble* union, as appears very probable, from the language St. Paul holds, and from the words of Christ, a *solemn, sacred, and indissoluble* union it will always remain for Christians, no matter how Statesmen speak, or write, or legislate to the contrary.

If Mr. Gladstone is so anxious to relieve the State of this embarrassing business of Matrimony, with its sacrament annexed to it, he may take a hint even from an adversary, sometimes “*jus est et ab hoste doceri.*” Let him begin at the beginning, let him go to the root of the difficulty, let him get Baptism forbidden by the State ; it is this Baptism that makes us Christians, it is it that makes us members of the Church, and fit subjects for the Sacrament of Matrimony. “Prevention is better than cure.” Let him do this, and he will wonderfully strengthen the hand of the State. Sacrament, or sacramental contract, need disturb it no longer. But let us be once made by Baptism members of that inexorable Church, there is no alternative for us when we marry, but to marry as Christians.

I find a proposition given in this place in the Appendix, which is not noticed in the pamphlet itself:—"The sons of the Catholic Church are of different opinions about the compatibility of temporal rule with spiritual." A proposition as to fact and opinion equally untrue.

Proposition Fifteen with the author is—"That the abolition of the temporal power of the Popedom would be highly advantageous to the Church." As condemned by the Pope it is—"The abrogation of the civil kingdom which the Apostolic See enjoys, would immensely conduce to the liberty and felicity of the Church."

How is it that Mr. Gladstone cannot keep to the text? *Abrogation* is the word of the Syllabus—he substitutes *abolition*. The sense is not the same; the first *may* mean the voluntary surrender which was often urged upon Pius IX.; the second *must* mean the forcible suppression of the temporal rule of the Pope. And how he loves generalities. "Highly advantageous to the Church" pleases him more than the phrase of the Syllabus—would "immensely conduce to the liberty and felicity of the Church." It is much more difficult for an adversary to deal with generalities than with definite assertions.

To speak of the Proposition as it is found in the Syllabus—as far as the experience of four years can enlighten us—the "abolition," for Mr. Gladstone had his way, has not contributed much "to the liberty nor to the felicity of the Church."

Proposition Sixteen is condemned, according to the Expostulation, for asserting "That any other religion than the Roman religion may be established by a State." The Proposition I find in the Syllabus is, "It is no longer expedient in this age of ours, that the Catholic religion should be upheld as the State religion, to the exclusion of all others of every kind."

The condemnation of the Proposition, as worded by Mr. Gladstone, is open to the interpretation that it is the teaching of the Pope, that in any State, even Protestant, no religion but the Catholic should be established. The censure of the Pope is really directed against the assertion, that the time has passed for upholding the Catholic religion as the State religion, with its implied insult—that though it may have done well enough in former times, it could not pass muster now.

Proposition Seventeen of Mr. Gladstone, lays down "That in countries called Catholic, the free exercise of other religions may be laudably allowed." The Proposition which the Pope deals with is—"That it has been *laudably* provided in certain Catholic countries, that it should be free for strangers settling amongst them to practice *publicly, any* form of worship peculiar to them."

Our author is not successful in his translations of the words of Papal documents. "Called Catholic"—nominally Catholic is not the meaning of "Catholici nominis," but "Catholic," "of the Catholic profes-

sion." The mistranslation is not of much importance in this place.

The point of the Proposition on which the condemnation falls, is its qualifying adverb, "laudably." The Pope does not think it praiseworthy in Catholic Governments to give free permission to all incomers to practice *publicly* any form of worship they may please to import with them. The reader must not omit to notice what is carefully left out of the Exposition, that there is question of strangers coming into a country, and not of fixed established inhabitants ; also that the permission approved of as praiseworthy is quite general and unrestricted. The authorities of Amsterdam were of the Pope's way of thinking on this *public* toleration of every kind of worship; when they suppressed the Anabaptist Adamites in the fifteenth century. The Government of the United States of America has come round to it of late in their dealings with the Mormons. Even England herself is becoming somewhat intolerant in the case of some contemptible religionists that are attracting attention at the moment.

Proposition Eighteen asserts "That the Roman Pontiff (can and) ought to come to terms with progress, liberalism, and modern *civilization*." For "*civilization*" read "civil policy," and the version may be allowed to stand. The Pope does not believe that he can adopt the friendly advice here given him. He does not see his way towards coming to terms with undefined theories, passing under the attractive names of "*pro-*

gress" and "liberalism." True progress in the cultivation of science, in the pursuit of literature, in the organization and civilizing of society, has always had Popes to encourage and to promote it. Genuine liberalism, the object of which is to secure for men, mentally and socially, the advantages of rational liberty, not of licence, will receive no opposition from the Catholic Church. But against that liberalism, which runs into Red Republicanism throughout France and Italy, into Communism in Paris, into Internationalism in England and in Germany—she has her orders to fight, and she cannot, and she ought not, to "come to terms with it."

As to modern civil policy, the third member of the Proposition, it is a rather cool request to ask her to come to terms with it, whose main object has been, and is, to depress her in her spiritual capacity, and to annihilate her temporal dominion.

The list of Propositions now closes. Mr. Gladstone thinks it sufficiently extended—so do I—so, I am persuaded, does the reader. Such a number of counterfeits out of Eighteen originals! There is not a single Proposition of them, if we except perhaps the seventh, given by Mr. Gladstone as it was condemned by the Pope. This may be the result of ignorance, for in all theological matters his ignorance is profound—wondrous—in a man of his position and of his pretensions. But the omissions, and the additions, and the mistranslations, are all so dexterously fitted in to the support of the theory he undertook to defend, that I

will as soon believe that the world in its order and correspondence of parts came out of a fortuitous combination of atoms, as that Mr. Gladstone's perversion of the Propositions of the Syllabus came *all* out of ignorance.

We have next three observations on the Propositions already treated of. Firstly, our author is not quite at his ease about his interpretation of them all. "A portion of them may, by the combined aid of favourable construction and vigorous (*sic*) explanation, be brought within bounds." What chance he afforded them of "favourable construction," we have already seen. In his observation, however, he puts aside the proviso altogether. He will admit construction only when it is allowed to be "an open question." What does he mean by having construction "an open question"? We generally understand an open question to be one on which intelligent men may hold different views, one which does not contain within its terms the elements of a certain solution. In construction there is no room for open question except in the solitary instance of ambiguous diction. In the Eighteen Propositions adduced, there is no ambiguity of diction as they are found in the Syllabus. We cannot say so much for them after the manipulation of Mr. Gladstone. Indeed they are so rudely hacked in his hands, that one is tempted to believe that the "rusty tools" of which he speaks are his own, not the Pope's.

The reason for not allowing the Papal condemnations the benefit of "favourable construction," which

Mr. Gladstone admits to be "the right general rule in controversies," is stated to be that the Pope, the *author* of the Propositions, claims to himself "the sole and unlimited power to interpret them in such manner and by such rules as he may from time to time think fit."

In the first place, the Pope is not the *author* of the Propositions of the Syllabus, but the censor of them.

In the second place, he does not "claim to himself the *sole* and unlimited power to interpret them from *time to time* as he *may think fit*," that is, to give them one meaning to-day, another to-morrow, according to his own caprice. The Pope, like any other legislator, is the authoritative interpreter of his own laws or decrees, but he is not the sole interpreter. The Canonist is the professional interpreter. Neither is he the "unlimited interpreter." He is limited in the same way as any other interpreter of laws, by the natural and usual signification of the words he has used.

Observation the second.—Mr. Gladstone has been evidently disappointed at not finding amongst the teachings of the Syllabus the "reaffirmation of the right to depose sovereigns, release subjects from their allegiance," &c., &c. It puzzles him; but he is not at all satisfied that what he seeks may not be hidden away somewhere. A "hasty perusal" will not suffice—those Roman Pontiffs are so wily—but perseverance and ingenuity, and making "constructionn a open question" can do a great deal, and if they do not

make out the thing itself that we are looking for, they must make out something like it, something that may be taken for it. Behold it, our author exclaims, in the Sixth and Seventh Propositions, not expressed in words but given in substance, thus: The Popes and Roman Councils have done things of this sort —“deposed sovereigns, released subjects from allegiance, inflicted penalties of life and limb, and liberty and goods.” The Syllabus declares that Popes and Roman Councils have not gone “beyond the limits of their power” All those things were, therefore, according to the Syllabus, within the limits of their power.

This argument, I think, gives the full force of our author’s reasoning. Still it only affirms at most the right of the Popes of former times to do what they *did*—it by no means reaffirms the same right for Popes in the present time. To bring out the latter conclusion, he should have interposed another Proposition to this effect—whatever the Popes and Roman Councils did in former times, and in totally different circumstances, the Pope claims the right to do now and in present circumstances. Without this there is no “reaffirming” of the obnoxious pretensions. Pio Nono, as we shall see, this moment recognises the fact of a complete change having taken place in the circumstances on which the claim to them rested. He will not supply us with the link necessary to make the reasoning good. When I taught logic four and twenty years ago, Mr. Gladstone’s sort of argument, the inference, “a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpli-

citer," was looked upon as a fallacy. Can it have ceased to be one since that time, or are there special exemptions allowed in the logic of a Statesman?

Mr. Gladstone is here opportunely "reminded of the words of Pope Pius the Ninth on the deposing power." Then the thing is beyond denial--there *is* such a theory as the deposing power *still in existence*. And he uses the word *right*. Then the Pope still *claims it*. These are the conclusions we are expected to arrive at, not, however, by process of reasoning--that would be too formal, and also may be dangerous to the conclusion--but by a much safer course, that of vague suggestion. Mr. Gladstone italicises the word "right" and the closing words of the passage, and leaves the matter to the reader. I will take the liberty of italicising a few others, and, without a shadow of misgiving, also leave the matter to the reader.

"There are many errors regarding the Infallibility, but the most malicious of all is that which includes in that dogma the right of deposing sovereigns and declaring the people no longer bound by the obligation of fidelity. This right has *now and again, in critical circumstances*, been exercised by the Pontiffs, but *it has nothing to do with Papal Infallibility*. Its origin was not the Infallibility, but *the authority* of the Pope. *This authority, in accordance with public right*, which was then vigorous, and with *the acquiescence of all Christian nations who revered in the Pope the supreme judge of the Christian commonwealth*, extended so far as to pass judgment, even in civil affairs, on the acts of princes and of nations."

I have adhered to Mr. Gladstone's version, in order to allow him all the advantage that might accrue to him from his own way of putting the expressions of the Pope's address, and how little it makes for him? The word given as "public right" should be "public law"—"vigorous," should be "in force." But "public right" or "public law," "acquiescence of *all* Christian nations," "Christian commonwealth," with its recognised "Supreme Judge"—those *grounds* on which Pio Nono explains and vindicates the "extending" of the authority of his predecessors "to civil affairs," to "the acts of princes and of nations," have long since become things of the past, and are recognised by His Holiness as such.

Observation third and last.—The teachings of the Syllabus are not "mere opinions of the Pope himself," nor pious beliefs "paternally recommended to the consideration of the faithful." No, Mr. Gladstone, but the cordially accepted creed of every son and daughter of the Church, in the sense in which they emanate from the Pope; but you are here again misquoting the Pope. His words do not refer to the Syllabus, but to the Propositions condemned in the particular Encyclical of November, 1864, already spoken of.

The author now passes to the consideration of his Third Proposition, but first gives us a sample of those "fearfully energetic epithets," which he avoided mentioning a few pages ago, for fear of "importing passion into the argument."

THIRD PROPOSITION.

Here, and henceforward, our author becomes exceedingly verbose, and less than ever argumentative. We are introduced to Dr. Von Döllinger, and we are informed that he “is the most famous and learned living Theologian of the Roman communion,” and this is addressed to Catholics who might be presumed to know their own great men, and did not require to be taught who they are by an alien to their faith and communion. Dr. Von Döllinger, the “greatest living Theologian” of the Catholic Church!!! The same who presided a few months ago at that attempt to compound an “olla podrida” of doctrines, when the Low Church Anglican and the High Church Anglican, and the Russian Schismatic, and the Scotch Presbyterian, and the American Evangelical, and the German Rationalist, threw each his ingredient into the cauldron in which Christianity was being re-cooked, to make it palatable to every taste.

Mr. Gladstone has great sympathy with the Doctor, and admiration for him and some unnamed few others; but as there is no advance made towards the proof of the Proposition, we cannot dwell on them any longer—we must pass on. We can afford only a passing remark to “the mighty trumpet of Luther” himself, just to say that we agree with Mr. Gladstone that it is still echoing through the land of Germany. The notes it sent forth in its master’s days were those of

overbearing intolerance and bitter persecution of all who did not bow to his dogmatic supremacy, be they Pope or fellow-Reformers—Leo X., or Zwingli, or Carlostad, or Calvin. With what multiplied reverberations do we not hear the same notes re-echoing there at present ?

In following our author through this portion of the Expostulation there is a good deal of wading through a watery medium, not always of the clearest, to be done, before we come upon anything of sufficient consistency to be dealt with as argument. We have mention of “moral murder,” “stifling of conscience or conviction,” “fermentation in mind of Latin Church,” “possible application of principles of machinery to intellectual and moral processes”—with a slap at the great Hierarchic power for “changing our religion over our heads”—“conviction that multitudes will vindicate their loyalty at the expense of their consistency”—“friendly challenge and entreaty to Roman Catholics to replace themselves with this nation and Parliament in their position of five and forty years ago”—all which Mr. Gladstone has a perfect right to say if it be his humour—but not just now, when he has undertaken to, and is ostensibly engaged in, establishing a charge of a most insulting and degrading kind against a venerable institution, and all men “who conscientiously attach themselves to it”—a charge which he never should have made unless he had the evidences of it clearly and distinctly before his own mind—and having made it, should place the

same clearly and distinctly before his reader. He told us himself that his "allegations were of great breadth, and as such required broad and deep foundations." Is this the way to lay broad and deep foundations? The statement he has made and promised to establish is—"That no one can now become the convert of Rome without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another." What has all this palaver to do with the proof of the truth or verisimilitude of this monstrous assertion? Men whose task it is to supply a certain quantity of printed matter are allowed, by the usage of our times, a considerable latitude in the way of digression, expansion, &c.; but this is no book-making matter; it is and ought to be regarded as the most important position that the ex-Premier ever undertook to defend—far more important to him in his Christian character than Land Bills or Education Bills—a position so aggressive, that if he fails in supporting it, nothing short of the reprobation of all truly Christian men must await him.

He renews the statement of his proposition, having first changed "surrenders" into "forfeits," as a more correct expression, and proposes to place the matter in as clear a light as possible. We cannot hope much from the clear light of Mr Gladstone. He wants to establish that the Pope's Infallibility was not a matter of Catholic belief forty-five years ago; that obedience to the Pope did not then trench upon allegiance to the Sovereign; that Catholics did not then believe in

the deposing power of the Pope, "with all its revolting consequences," or hold that they were not bound to keep faith with heretics; and his way of establishing all these, is to lead us through a lengthy, and, here and there, broken narrative of the precautions taken by British statesmen of fifty to forty years since, before they could be satisfied as to the safety and expediency of repealing certain "pettifogging, base, and cruel laws," up to that time in force against Catholics. He did not need to take all this trouble. We would have granted him all that he wanted for the asking. There was no necessity for making a fuss about the satisfactory nature of the answers obtained for the Select Committee of 1816, 1817, or that of 1824, 1825. In all that is substantial in the questions, the same answers would have been obtained in 1874, 1875, with the sole exception, that Papal Infallibility, which was at that time only a general opinion with the Church, has since been defined to be a matter of faith. Our author has, however, chosen to go through this long process, and his commenter has only to follow him.

Through a page or so devoted to what British statesmen feared, or did, or expected, nothing turns up that bears at all on the Proposition we are concerned about. There is a polite remark about the "fangs" and "claws" of the mediæval Popedom, an assertion that "the theory which placed every human being, in things spiritual and things *temporal*, at the feet of the Roman Pontiff," was one practically taken

up and promoted “by brain power never surpassed in the political history of the world,” and that it led to the Latin conquest of Constantinople, and the downfall of the Eastern Empire, and the establishment of the Turks in Europe—allegations of such great breadth truly, that one is curious to see their foundations, but is not favoured with a glimpse of them. At length we arrive at some mention of the Infallibility of the Pope and the obedience claimed for him from his flock. The Gallican Church is introduced, with a reference to the “days of its glory and of its intellectual power.” Of its glory we have nothing to say—we do not quite comprehend the allusion; of its intellectual power, we have never heard before this. In the list of classic Theologians there is not found the name of a single Gallican. As an influential churchman and finished orator, Bossuet occupies some space on that page of French history; and for his gentleness of spirit, and polished scholarship, and noble docility, Fenelon is a man that his country should be proud of. But neither of them was a name of weight in Catholic schools of Theology. As for the denial of Infallibility, it was quite open to the Gallicans to deny it at the time, but a sorry face indeed they were able to put on their argument against it. In their other opinion on the independence, or, as they styled it, the *liberties* of their local Church, they were even more unsuccessful. These were so irreconcilable with the Primacy and Centreship of unity of the Sovereign Pontiff—a doctrine never questioned in the Church—and were so evidently the effusions of a state-

ridden Theology, that when we say they were broached by a portion of the Gallican clergy—thirty-four out of one hundred and thirty bishops, in the year 1682—we give nearly their full history. They were talked about and boasted of from time to time, but never received real Theological defence or support. I remember that it was a common exercise of ingenuity with Theological students of thirty years ago to endeavour to reconcile the Gallican liberties with the received doctrine of the Church, in just the same way that in the days of our philosophy we used to harrass our brains about the squaring of the circle and the trisection of an angle.

We have next the Council of Constance, “showing in act as well as in word, that the Pope’s judgments and the Pope himself were triable by the assembled representatives of the Christian world.” How Mr. Gladstone does go on! In the Council of Constance no Pope’s judgment was tried—in the Council of Constance no Pope was tried—but three pretenders to the Papal throne, that had kept the Church in turmoil and confusion for years, had their claims examined, and were, one after another, set aside, and a Pontiff, whose election by the Council itself did not admit of doubt or dispute, was given to Christendom—Martin V. The action of the Council was in perfect harmony with what we have already written on the Constitution of the Church. Christ’s commission is always and unceasingly in force—the *Ecclesia audiens* is never left without an *Ecclesia docens*. Popes will die

like other men, and in providing for the succession, delays may happen and difficulties may arise, and the election itself may be disputed or may be uncanonical, for the electors are neither impeccable nor infallible—and a good deal of time must then elapse before mistakes can be corrected, or disputes adjusted—and meantime errors and pernicious doctrines may be making havoc amongst the faithful—it then devolves on the Church Teaching to proceed in that form and in that direction in which the Spirit of Truth guides her, until the regular order of things shall be again established.

The Council of Constance it was that condemned the errors of John Wickliffe, a man thought much of amongst English Protestant writers, because they do not make themselves acquainted with his doctrines; also John Huss, who taught “that any vassal or subject may lawfully, and even meritoriously, procure the death of a despotic lord, by open violence or by secret and premeditated plot, even though an oath had to be violated;” and Jerome of Prague, an eloquent but noisy supporter of Wickliffe and of Huss. John Huss and Jerome of Prague were handed over to the “secular arm,” and condemned to be burnt. I wonder at Mr. Gladstone speaking well of Constance.

From the Council of Constance to the Council of Trent—we are informed that it, “notwithstanding the predominance of Italian and Roman influences—if it *had not denied*, yet had not affirmed either Proposition,” the Infallibility of the Pope, or the universal obedience claimed for him from his flock. The impli-

cation contained in Mr. Gladstone's language is, that neither of these Propositions was taught by the Council of Trent—that it was nearer to teaching their opposite. Has he ever looked into the Canons and Decrees of the Council? He must permit me now to refer him to session xxv. chapter 2 :—"The holy Synod commands all Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, &c., that in their first provincial Synod they receive all and every the definitions and statutes of this holy Synod, and that they also promise and profess *due obedience* to the Supreme Pontiff."

And again, to session xxv. chapter 21 :—"The holy Synod declares that all and every the statutes made in this Sacred Council, were so *made and decreed* as not to *infringe on*, or *be thought to infringe on*, the *authority* of the Apostolic See." And the last act of the Council is to commission "the presiding Legates of the Holy See to ask, in the name of the holy Synod from the Roman Pontiff, the *confirmation of all its decrees and definitions*." They would hardly have submitted "*all their decrees and definitions*" to an authority which they believed to be fallible.

"Testimony never to be forgotten," and "declarations" having, I presume, an equal claim to immortality, are now adduced to show—what? As I have already stated, that Catholics were not then bound to believe in the Infallibility of the Pope, that Catholics were bound "to obey the Pope in matters regarding their religious faith," but "their obedience to the law, and allegiance they owe the Sovereign, were complete.

full, and perfect and undivided, inasmuch as they *extend to all political, legal, and civil rights* of the king and his subjects." And "that the allegiance due to the king, and the allegiance due to the Pope, are as distinct and divided in their nature as two things possibly can be."

There was no necessity for having recourse to solemn "Declarations, Pastoral Addresses," or "never to be forgotten testimonies," to extort from us an admission of these principles or facts. In the present hour we freely admit, that before the definition was made in the Vatican Council, it was not necessary to believe in Papal Infallibility ; we admit that a man may, up to that time, be a Catholic, and assert that the Decrees emanating from the Pontiff were not irreformable until the consent of the Church was added to the teaching of the Pope. We admit that it is in *religious*, and not in civil matters, obedience is due to the Pope ; that obedience and allegiance are due to the king, queen, or existing legitimate government ; that the domain commanded by the power of the king is divided and distinct from that commanded by the Pope. Mr. Gladstone did not then need to take so much trouble about the matter, unless he fancied it. The answers just given are those of Dr. Doyle, who, we are told, "more than any other Prelate represented his Church," and are thought by our author to be in violent contrast with the expressed views of a living Prelate, Dr. Manning, the "head," he tells us, "of the Papal Church in England." The contrast is as-

serted at this part of the Expostulation, but the Archbishop's words are not given for some pages, and no allusion is then made to the present assertion, so that I think it better, lest we should forget it, and also that we may not keep a quarrel that can be decided on the spot hanging over our heads, to join issue at once. The words of the dead Prelate are still before the reader's eye ; the words of the living Prelate are—“ The spiritual power knows with *divine certainty the limits of its own jurisdiction*, and it knows, therefore, the limits and the competence of the civil power.” And again : “ Any power which is independent, and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions, is, *ipso facto*, supreme. The Church of Jesus Christ, within the sphere of *revelation, of faith and morals*, is all this ” I can see no contradiction between the living and the dead. Both quite agree as to the distinction and separateness of the civil and spiritual jurisdictions. Both admit that the object of the spiritual is something spiritual. The dead Prelate limits the civil jurisdiction expressly to “ political, legal, and civil rights.” “ But ”—Mr. Gladstone may interpose—“ he does ” not claim supremacy for the spiritual jurisdiction, as Dr. Manning does. The dead Prelate gives us no views at all on the question ; the living Prelate limits his assertion to “ matters of religion and conscience.” Men must say *Yes* and *No* on the same question in order to contradict one another.

RECAPITULATION.

“Papal Infallibility was most solemnly declared to be a matter on which each man might think as he pleased. The Pope’s power to claim obedience was strictly and narrowly limited ; it was expressly denied that he had any title, direct or indirect, to interfere in civil government. Of the right of the Pope to define the limits which divide civil from the spiritual by his own authority, not one word is said by the Prelates of either country.”

“Since that time all these Propositions have been reversed.” It is not pleasant to be obliged to contradict Mr. Gladstone so roundly on every issue he raises, but it must be done. “Since that time” *not one* of these Propositions has been *reversed*—not even Papal Infallibility. What was a generally received opinion at that time is an universally-believed *doctrine* now. If Papal Fallibility had been the *doctrine* of the Church then, as Papal Infallibility is now, the Proposition would have been reversed. As it is, the Papal Infallibility has only been explained—defined not to require the assent of the Church, tacit or express, for its valid exercise.

“The Pope’s power to claim obedience” was not reversed ; it was not affected in the slightest degree by anything done since the time referred to. We shall have occasion lower down to go into this question of obedience more fully.

“It was expressly denied that he had any title, direct or indirect, to interfere in civil government.” It is not asserted now. No reversion of Proposition.

“The Prelates *said nothing* of the right of the Pope to define the limits which divide the civil power from the spiritual.” They said nothing—then, of course, there is nothing here to be reversed. They said nothing, because they were not asked the question. But had they been asked, the answer would and should have been then as it is now—the Pope, in the exercise of his supreme authority, *must know* the domain over which that authority extends, and, by the fact, has the power and the right of fixing its limits.

An observation may appropriately be let in here on what our author says of the Prelates or others who gave evidence to the British Government in the Commissions of 1824, 1825, and of the Catholic body being “bound by them as selected and typical witnesses.” There is nothing actually given from their evidence that we should refuse to be bound by, and, in general, as far as they are exponents of Catholic doctrines, we adopt them; but if they become on any questions exponents of their own private views, they no longer remain to us in the relation of professional witnesses, and their opinions are exactly of the value that the soundness of judgment and range of erudition of their authors entitle them to. If, for instance, any of them supplied, even in substance, the phrase that Mr. Gladstone sets down to their credit, when he says that :—

“Answers in abundance were obtained, that in regard to the obnoxious doctrines being obsolete beyond revival, every assurance could be given that did not require *the shame of a formal retractation*”—we have no share in their sentiment. Or if any of them volunteered a flippant opinion on grave and largely disputed facts of Papal history, for the obvious purpose of smoothening matters with his interrogators, he is, perhaps, the type of a clever, and, for the time being, convenient, but not of a Catholic witness.

Other observations also, sprinkled here and there through the Expostulation, would call for some comment, did time and patience permit; but we must push on. Between Mr. Gladstone and myself very little progress is made, and it is a weary way yet to the conclusion. We have the Infallibility to go into again, but this time fully, and we have to treat of obedience exhaustively. Firstly, however, a duty devolves on the author. He has shown his pity for his quiet-minded, and, indeed, for his lay Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen generally. He has expressed in strong language his deep sympathy with Dr. Von Döllinger and his few courageous adherents. Here is a still wider and more venerable object of his condolence. The Episcopal order of the Latin Church is degraded—a monstrous change in the constitution of that Church has been consummated! Is proof required? Behold it in “the change, amounting to revolution, of form in the present (the Vatican) Decrees, as compared with other conciliatory (conciliar?) decrees.” “The Canons

of the Council of Trent were at least the Canons of a real Council," and the strain in which they are promulgated is this : "Hæc sacrosancta, ecumenica, et generalis Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata, in eâ presidentibus eisdem tribus Apostolicis Legatis, hortatur, or docet, or statuit, or decernit, and the like." *Obiter*, it is pleasant to find Mr. Gladstone recognising an Œcumenical Council as a real one. He has improved since he treated the Sixth Proposition of the Syllabus.

"Its Canons are—*Canones et decreta Sacrosancti Œcumenici concilii Tridentini.*"

"But what we have now to do with is, the *Constitutio Dogmatica Prima de Ecclesia Christi edita in sessione tertia* of the Vatican Council. It is not a Constitution made by the Council, but one promulgated in the Council. . . . The humble share of the assembled Episcopate in the transaction (*sic*) is represented by *sacro approbante concilio.*"

Poor Episcopate, poor Bishops ! how kindly they take to their degradation ! How faithfully they cling to the Head that has degraded them ! How bravely and how loyally they rally round their Chief, and go with him "into prison and to death !" How many have deserted him out of the bitter feeling of their degradation ? Mr. Gladstone, you know nothing about us.

But, the *Canones Concilii Tridentini*, and the *Dogmatica Constitutio de Ecclesia Christi*—the Council of Trent and the Vatican Council—what of them ? Is

it *fact* that the first was a Council of *Bishops*, and the second a Council of—*the Pope*? Is it *fact* that dogmatic decrees were made in the one, and that it was only dogmatic decrees, already made, were announced in the other? Is it *fact* that the *Hæc Sacrosancta Synodus decernit* of Trent, differs vitally from the *docemus et definimus* of the Vatican? Is it *fact* that the phrase, “*Sacro approbante concilio*,” is a novelty introduced in the Vatican Council for the degradation of the Episcopate of the Latin Church?

I am so weary of contradicting Mr. Gladstone, that I will merely give the reader a little additional information which Mr. Gladstone has not given, and let him pronounce himself on the *facts*.

“The Council of Trent was a Council of Bishops.” Yes, but a Council of Bishops who incorporated into every Decree they made the fact, that the three Legates of the Pope were presiding at their deliberations and definitions—“*Hæc Sacrosancta Synodus in Spiritu Sancto congregata, in ea presidentibus eisdem tribus Apostolicis Legatis;*” and not content with this provision for the Papal right, in session xxv. cap. 21, declared all they had done to be dependent on the Apostolic See, and referred the entire question of books and censures to the Pontiff; and in the final session—a continuation of session xxv.—postulated of the Holy Father, through the same three Legates, a confirmation of *all* that they had decreed and defined. I have alluded to the text of the postu-

lation before, but as it is in place here it may be repeated in full :—

“ Illustrissimi Domini, Reverendissimique Patres, placet ne vobis ut ad laudem Dei Omnipotentis, huic Sacræ Œcumenicæ Synodo finis imponatur? et *omnium et singulorum*, quæ tam sub. fel. rec. Paulo III. et Julio III. quum sub sanctissimo Domino nostro Pio IV. Romanis Pontificibus, in ea decreta et definita sunt, *confirmatio nomine Sanctæ hujus Synodi*, per Apostolicæ Sedis Legatos et Præsidentes a beatissimo Romano Pontifice petatur? Responderunt—Placet.”

The Vatican Council was a Council of the Pope, who incorporated into the first dogmatic constitution published in the Council, and which sets forth the aim and object of the Council—the fact that the Bishops of the Church were sitting with him and *judging*. It is important that the words should be given in full :—

“ Nunc autem sedentibus nobiscum et *judicantibus* universi orbis Episcopis, in hanc œcumenicam Synodum auctoritate Nostra in Spiritu Sancto congregatis, innixi Dei verbo scripto et tradito, prout ab Ecclesiâ Catholicâ sancte custoditum et genuine expositum accepimus; ex hac Petri Cathedra in conspectu omnium salutarem Christi doctrinam profiteri et declarare constituimus, adversis erroribus potestate nobis a Deo tradita, proscriptis atque damnatis.”

The answer to the second question I have put is evident from this text of the Vatican Council, and the one just quoted from the Council of Trent.

Dogmatic Decrees were made in the Council of Trent by the Bishops, *dependent* on and *awaiting the confirmation of the Pope* ; Dogmatic Decrees were made in the Vatican Council by the Bishops *conjointly with the Pope*—"nobiscum judicantibus."

Dogmatic Decrees were not "edita"—published—to the Church in the Council of Trent, because as yet they lacked the confirmation of the Pope. Dogmatic Decrees were "edita"—published—in the Council of the Vatican, because, as the Pope "judged" conjointly with the Bishops, his confirmation was given by the fact.

The third question, whether the form "*Hæc Sacrosancta Synodus decernit*" differs vitally from the "*docemus et definimus*" of the Vatican is, from the above, easy of solution. The "*decernit*" of Trent is *incomplete* and *expectant*—the "*docemus*" of the Vatican is *complete* and *definitive*.

The fourth is the great question, and the one on which depend the charges of the degradation of the Episcopate, of the "change amounting to revolution" in the form of the Decrees of Councils, and of the existence in the Church at present of a "spirit of centralization, as fatal to vigorous life in the Church as in the State, and of this spirit having reached its last and furthest point of possible advancement and exaltation." We must look closely into this, especially into the phrase, "*Sacro approbante concilio.*"

If it involve the degradation of the Episcopate, it certainly would not be admitted by the Theologians of

the "great Gallican Church in the days of its glory." They stood boldly up for the rights of the Bishops, and in opposition to the pretensions of the Popes. And yet positive approbation is something more than tacit assent, and tacit assent which, according to the great Gallican authority, Tournely, meant silence and non-reclamation, was according to them, a sufficient *share* for the universal Episcopate of the Church to have in the *ex cathedra* definitions of the Pope. Their theory required two elements to an infallible definition, a Papal and an Episcopal. If the teaching commenced with the Bishops, it required the confirmation of the Pope ; if it commenced with the Pope, it required the assent of the Bishops. But they saw no difference in the Infallibility, whichever element was put in motion first. The form, "Sacro approbante concilio," would have exactly suited them. In truth, it is a style of definition most respectful to the Gallican theory.

It is not, then, insulting to the Episcopate. Neither is it a novelty, a "change amounting to revolution." We have more than two words to say on this head.

Retracing the history of General Councils from Trent, the first met with is the 5th of Lateran, A.D. 1512, commenced under Julius II., and completed under Leo X. In it the phrase, "Sacro approbante concilio," is found at the head, or incorporated into every important Decree, whether of Julius or of Leo. This at once disposes of the charge, that it was an innovation of the Vatican Council. In the indulgence

of a reasonable curiosity, we may be allowed to extend our search a little farther back, to the Council of Florence, celebrated under Pope Eugene IV., A.D. 1438. Behold, here it turns up again. In the Bull against the pseudo-Council of Basle, promulgated in this Synod, the Pope using, as in the Vatican, what Mr. Gladstone calls "the ceremonious We," speaks thus, "*Hoc sacro approbante concilio renovamus.*"

As the Council of Constance, of which the Exposition speaks approvingly more than once, precedes that of Florence by only twenty-four years, it may as well be examined for the phrase. It cannot occur in the earlier sessions, as those were occupied in getting rid of antipopes, and dealing with certain errors for the suppression of which a demand of urgency was made. But as soon as a real legitimate Pope appears in the Council—Martin V.—sure as fate, the obnoxious phrase also appears. And what is still more remarkable, the Fathers of Constance had the weakness or the meanness to petition this same Pope, made by themselves, to ratify and confirm what they had decreed before his appointment, which he did, but under limitation to matters of faith. Our author must think them sad recreants for so lowering the authority of the Council.

Could Martin V., for he was a determined asserter of Papal claims, have been the first to introduce the phrase? Impossible. Clement V. uses it in the Council of Vienne, A.D. 1311, in his Decree, "*De Summa Trinitate et fide Catholica.*" So does Gregory X. in the Second Council of Lyons, 1274, at which a

temporary restoration of the Greeks to the unity of the Church took place, after they had given up their error about the Holy Ghost, and sung conjointly with the Latins the word "Filioque" in the creed. In the Decree of Faith he has "*nos sacro approbante concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes qui negare præsumpserint Spiritum Sanctum a Patre Filioque procedere.*" The Greeks accepted the phrase as well as the condemnation of their error.

In the First Council of Lyons, Innocent IV. publishes the Decrees, "*Sacro approbante Concilio,*" but denounces the Emperor Frederic, "*Sacro præsentis concilio.*" He thus takes upon himself all the responsibility of the second act, whilst he makes the Bishops his co-operators in the first. In the Fourth of Lateran, under Innocent III., it is "*Nos autem sacro et universali approbante concilio credimus et confitemur,*" &c. In Lateran III., under Alexander III., the phrase is "*Sacri approbatione Concilii.*" In the Second of Lateran, under Innocent II., and in the First, under Callistus II., the presiding Pontiff similarly defines and decrees in his own name, with the consent and approbation of the assisting Fathers.

We are now as far back in the history of the Church as the year of our Lord 1122, and have arrived at the first General or Œcumenical Council of the West, and we find that the use of the "We of Royal declaration," and of the phrase "with the approbation of the Sacred Council," which were brought forward by Mr. Gladstone to prove, by their novelty and their *innovation* in the Vatican Council, the present de-

graded state of the Latin Episcopate, is the rule, *without exception*, in every Council in which the Pope presides in person.

It is really wonderful that Mr. Gladstone did not look or inquire into the usual forms of Conciliary Decrees before he threw his hands up in that extraordinary manner over the woes and the downfall of the Latin Episcopate. I presume he knew that the Pope presided at the Vatican Council in person ; he certainly knew, for he gives the text himself, that he presided at Trent by his three Legates, and it ought not require much reflection to conclude that the difference in the character of the Presidents would involve a difference in the forms of definition. All Catholics have at all times conceded to the Pope “*primas et præcipuas partes*” in the teaching of the Church ; what then more natural than that he to whom the principal part was admitted to belong, should, when presiding in person, speak in his proper character ?

What recklessness of assertion our author indulges in throughout this remarkable production of his !

THE QUESTION OF INFALLIBILITY OF THE POPE.

“*Docemus et divinitus revelatum dogma esse definimus, Romanum Pontificem, cum ex Cathedra loquitur, id est cum omnium Christianorum Pastoris et Doctoris munere fungens, pro suprema sua Apostolica auctoritate, doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa*

Ecclesia tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in Beato Petro promissam, ea infallibilitate pollere, qua Divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit : ideoque ejus Romani Pontificis definitiones ex sese non autem ex consensu Ecclesiæ irreformabiles esse."

Having given the definition, Mr. Gladstone proceeds to argue against it after a strange fashion. The Pope had claimed Infallibility, "sacro approbante Concilio," only in the case of his teaching *ex cathedra*. Mr. Gladstone will have it that the privilege is secured to him in a far more unlimited manner; in fact, that it is left optional with him to bring under its influence anything and everything he pleases. "There are twelve theories," he is told, "bandied to and fro amongst Roman Theologians," and "the private conscience" of the Catholic "has no guide to direct him in his choice, except the discarded agency of his private judgment;" whilst, on the other hand, the Pope can declare that a matter is *ex cathedra* "when and as he pleases."

The plain English of all this is—the Infallibility is a sham, the Pope knows it is a sham, there are no divinely fixed limits to its exercise, it is all in the Pope's own hands, he can do as he wishes with it, he can bring anything he pleases under it, "when and as he pleases." This, forsooth, is an "Expostulation" with Roman Catholics!

The twelve theories about the meaning of the words "*ex cathedra*," have the same foundation in fact

that the "change amounting to revolution" in the form of the Vatican Decrees has been shown to have had. The subject, the object, the matter, and the conditions of *ex cathedra* teaching are laid down in the definition itself with a fulness and a distinctness that leave no room for theory or opinion about what we are *bound to believe*. The circumstances under which there is certainty of the presence of infallible teaching are clear and intelligible to all Catholics. The circumstances under which there is an approximation to certainty are questions for Theologians, and are discussed freely in our schools. These are probably the twelve (or perhaps more) theories that are "bandied about amongst Roman Theologians." For instance, one of them would be—Is the Pope infallible in teaching a particular Church, say the Church of France, in the matter of faith, or is it possible that he could teach error in a Decree directed to *it*, but not to the Universal Church? But these scholastic disputes no more affect the defined truth of Papal Infallibility, than the controversy about the *manner* in which the Sacraments confer grace, interferes with the *doctrine that* the Sacraments *do* confer grace.

There is another meaning, and one implying a difficulty in connexion with this doctrine of infallible *ex cathedra* teaching, to be taken from the words of the paragraph under consideration, but I do not think it was intended by Mr. Gladstone—it is not in his line. Lest it should have been, it is better to deal with it.

“No one but the Pope can declare *ex cathedra* what is *ex cathedra*,” he writes, and the meaning that the words ought to carry is : “There is no one but the Pope can declare infallibly what it is that is infallibly taught.” The inconvenient consequence that follows is, that the practical application of Infallibility begins and ends with the Pope. I cannot declare *infallibly* that a certain doctrine is taught me *infallibly*. Of what use, then, is the privilege to me? How does it reach my faith? How can I believe what is propounded to me unless I first know infallibly that it has been infallibly propounded?

The same style of reasoning applies to inspiration. No one can know by inspiration what is or what is not taught by inspiration except the individual inspired. But the answer is not far off. It is not necessary that it should be known by inspiration—it is sufficient that it be known with certainty that the teaching is inspired; and similarly, it is not necessary that the person taught should be infallible in his reception of the teaching, as well as that the person teaching should be infallible in his communication of it. It is quite sufficient that he who is taught should know for certain when he is taught infallibly; faith then comes in and does the rest. This, however, is necessary for the Church in its aggregate form. The universal Church cannot *receive* false doctrine any more than the *Ecclesia docens* can *impart* it. The gates of Hell are never to prevail against Her.

And thus, though as Mr. Gladstone puts it, "no document which the Pope issues shall be valid without a seal, and the seal remains under his own lock and key," we of the Church can always identify the characters which the seal of our Teacher impresses.

We pass away at length from the Pope's Infallibility, a privilege not, as it is commonly described, *personal*, but *official*, not exercisable at the caprice of the individual Pontiff, but according to the requirements of his office—not an inherent quality of the man, but an assistance from without, from the Spirit of God, which keeps an erring man from actual error, when he is teaching the Church of Christ. "Cum, omnium Christianorum Pastoris et Doctoris munere fungens."

Our author now indulges in one of his usual digressions from the subject in hand for the humane purpose of inducing statesmen to withdraw civil protection from Roman Catholics. "A religious society, which delivers volleys of spiritual censures in order to impede the performance of civil duties, does all the mischief that it is in its power to do, and brings into question, in the face of the State, *its title to civil protection*." What a virus must be at work within when it betrays itself in symptoms such as these? To such a charge, if it be necessary to reply—for I doubt if one statesman in England would subscribe to it—we have only to state before God and men, that we are taught by our Church to obey the civil law and not to impede it; to fulfil our civil duties

and not to evade them. We have no other answer to make to Mr. Gladstone's vague and undefined, but most injurious calumny on our Church.

SOMETHING ABOUT MORALS.

In order to show the comprehensiveness of the Pope's claim under the new definition, Mr. Gladstone puts a question to the Roman Casuists about the extent of the domain of *morals*. And as, he says, they will not answer him—he did not wait long for the answer—he has recourse to Mr. Matthew Arnold, and out of him he teaches us that seventy-five per cent. of what we do, belongs to the department of “conduct.” Conduct he proceeds to make nearly co-extensive with morals. Thus seventy-five per cent. of our lives are handed over at once to the Pope—alarming! Is it not? “But who will guarantee us the other fourth? Certainly not St. Paul, who says, ‘whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do *all* to the glory of God.’” Mr. Gladstone must pardon me if I observe, *en passant*, that he might as well have taken the four-fourths from St. Paul, who says “*all*” and “*whatever*,” and is a somewhat higher authority than Mr. Arnold. Or if he had sincerely sought the opinion of the Roman Moralists, he would have been informed by them that every deliberate act performed by man is morally good or morally bad. They infer, from certain words of the Master, to the effect, that man shall have to “account for every idle word he

speaks," the existence of a moral responsibility in all our words, and, by a parity of reason, in all our actions. They agree with Mr. Gladstone that Duty is something in constant attendance on us, the monitor and the moderator of all our actions, not however as he describes it, in the form of a dark shadow dogging our steps, but rather as a "cloud by day, a pillar of fire by night." So that whatever authorities we consult, the same inevitable conclusion awaits us, that the entire of our actions are at once placed under the guidance and control of the Pope.

But this is not the worst, and I wonder our author overlooked what I am about to add. It is not alone our actions that are thus subjected to this autocrat from whom appeal is not permitted; our beliefs, all our relations to faith, as well as our relations to morality, are placed in the same degrading servitude, for he is the infallible Teacher of Christian faith as well as of Christian morality.

After all, why should this disturb Mr. Gladstone? He ignores the Pope's authority in faith; he is not then under any obligation to hold it in morals. For us Catholics he need not worry himself; we are "to the manner born;" we are not conscious of any oppressiveness in the burden that he sees us laden with. It is thus with us. We always believed the Pope to be our supreme guide in faith and morals. Since the Vatican Definition we believe him to be our Supreme and Infallible Guide—this we look upon as a decided improvement in our position. But though we profess

that our morals and our faith are under his Supreme and Infallible Guidance, we do not believe that he can make or unmake either morals or faith. They came to him who held the office first, already made, and they have come down from him through a succession of custodians without flaw or stain to our day, when we find them in the keeping of the Supreme Pontiff Pius, ninth of the name. It is his duty to watch, lest any change be introduced into those truths of faith and morals that have been previously taught. “Nihil innovetur.” It is his duty also to supply additional truths out of the same original deposit, according to the necessities of the faithful, and in his fulfilment of these duties he is not *alone*. “Not I,” says St. Paul, “but the grace of God with me.” In brief, we believe that the words of the commission, “Feed my lambs, feed my sheep,” have not passed away ; that they have been always and are still in vigour, and that Christ empowers Pio Nono as fully as he empowered Peter to teach men his doctrine, and to keep them up to his code of morals. We are perfectly resigned to have all our actions and all our beliefs handed over to the Pope in this way. We are satisfied with our system ; we are happy in our faith. Indeed you might envy us, Mr. Gladstone.

ON OBEDIENCE.

Bad as Infallibility appeared to be, something immensely worse turns up now under the style and

title of *obedience*. “Infallibility had a reach as wide as it *pleased the Pope*, or those who *may prompt the Pope*, to make it.” Understand this, you Roman Catholic expostulated. It is all a pretence about Infallibility being anything instituted by Christ, and the Pope and those who prompt him are well aware of it. It is all in their own hands; they can make it reach as far as they please, and there is nothing and nobody to prevent them. How pitilessly does your friend insult you in your faith! Which do you admire more, the vigour of his audacity or the infirmity of his reasoning? But let us proceed; we have had tarryings enough in this wearisome chapter. “The sounding name of Infallibility has fascinated the public mind, and rivetted it on the fourth chapter of the Constitution ‘de Ecclesia.’” The third chapter, in which the doctrine of obedience is laid down, “has received much less than justice.” Obedience is not hampered “by the qualifying condition of *ex cathedra*.” “It renders the Papal judgments unappealable and irreversible even where they do not present the credentials of Infallibility.” It stops the mouth of any man who would “pass judgment upon them.” “It has an iron gripe.” It demands “conformity in cases in which he admits it to be possible he may be wrong, but finds it intolerable to be told so.”

The reader, who is not a Catholic, takes for granted from these statements—Firstly, that this doctrine of obedience was heard of for the first time in the third

chapter of the Constitution “de Ecclesia” of the Vatican Council.

Secondly, that all that Mr. Gladstone has said about it above are facts. Let us see—but first let us have the teaching of the third chapter before us.

“The faithful and pastors of every rite and dignity, individually and collectively, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, not only in matters relating to faith and morals, but also in those that belong to the discipline and regimen of the Church spread throughout the world. This is a doctrine of Catholic truth, from which no one can deviate without danger of faith and of salvation.”

“We also teach and declare that he (the Pope) is the supreme judge of the faithful, and that in all causes requiring ecclesiastical examination, recourse can be had to him, and that the judgment of the Apostolic See, whose authority is supreme, can be set aside by no one. Neither is it allowed to any one to pronounce judgment on his judgment.”

I find something very like this same hierarchical subordination and obedience to the Roman Pontiff prescribed in the Council of Trent, Sess. xxv., *de Reformatione*, cap. ii.—“The Holy Synod moreover commands all Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, &c., to promise and profess true obedience to the Roman Pontiff.” “The Pastors of every dignity” are expressly designated here, “Patriarchs, Primates, &c.,” and the obligation of “true obedience,” is as emphatically laid on them as in the words of the

Vatican. Yet this was a "real Council," and its canons were "the canons of the Sacred Œcumenical Council of Trent," not "constitutions merely promulgated in the Council." And lest any one should insinuate that this true obedience was limited to faith and morals, we have only to refer to the passage already cited from Sess. xxv., cap. 21, in which the Fathers of the Council declare that all and every the decrees of the Council, whether regarding the reformation of morals or ecclesiastical *discipline*, were made in such a way as "that it should be understood that the authority of the Roman Pontiff in *these matters* remained always supreme." So much for discipline. In the continuation of the same Sess. xxv., in the Decree of the 4th December, it is ordained that the Bishops should report to the Holy See the abuses in the matter of indulgences existing in their respective Churches, in order that the Pope may, "by his *authority* and wisdom decree what would be useful for the universal Church." Again, in Sess. vi., cap. 1, non-residing Bishops, metropolitan or suffragan, are to be denounced to the Roman Pontiff, "who will, in virtue of his supreme authority, inflict punishment on them absent, and provide for their churches, as under God's help he may judge expedient." Right of regimen and finality of judgment are here most liberally accorded to the Pope by the Holy Synod.

This idea of obedience to the Pope in discipline, and in Church regimen or administration, is therefore not original in the Vatican Council. The Council of

Trent is quite as "Ultramontane" in its concessions to the Papal prerogatives. But the thing did not begin even at Trent. In the ninth year of the Pontificate of Eugene IV., A.D. 1439, in the Council of Florence, after several sessions spent in discussion and explanation, a Decree of Union was subscribed by the Greek and Latin Fathers conjointly, in which, amongst many other valuable declarations, we read the following: "We also define that the Roman Pontiff has primacy over the entire Church, and that he is the successor of St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and true Vicar of Christ, and that he is the Head of the Universal Church, and Father and Teacher of all Christians, and that our Lord Jesus Christ delivered to him, in the person of blessed Peter, the full authority to feed, to *rule*, and to *govern* the Universal Church."

Not less clear and emphatic are the words subscribed by the Armenians on their union with the Church effected in the same Council of Florence:—"Professing as *true sons of obedience* to obey in all faithfulness the *ordinations and commands of the Apostolic See*." The importance of these testimonies cannot be overrated. They show that one of the essential conditions for the admission of the separated Greek and Armenian Churches into the unity of the Catholic Church, was the recognition of the duty of submission and obedience to the Roman Pontiff. If it was a new idea, or if it was anything less than a recognised tradition of the Church, it would not have been made a

“*conditio sine quâ non*” of reconciliation, at so momentous a crisis by the Latins, nor would it have been so promptly accepted by both Greeks and Armenians.

We might go on piling up testimonies from Councils, from Decrees of Pontiffs, from Canonists, from Theologians, even from those of the deepest Gallican dye, to prove that this doctrine of obedience to the Pontiff, as set forth in the Vatican Council, is nothing more than a repetition of what had been always held and taught; but enough must have been said. And is it not contained in the very idea of the Primacy? For the Primacy of our Pontiff is not a bare post of honour. It means, power, authority, jurisdiction in him, and in the Church universal corresponding subordination. It realises to our minds the image of the Church of Christ placed before us by St. Paul—a living body, presided over by a living Head.

How, in the name of common sense, did Mr. Gladstone wander away into this vagary about submission to the Pope in discipline and in ecclesiastical administration, being a new invention patented by the Vatican Council with some wicked deep design? Can he be really so nervous as to be liable to mistake living beings for phantoms, his excited imagination filling in gigantic proportions and all the other requisites of horror. The probability of the supposition is borne out by more than one passage of the *Exposition*. In the beginning of Section V. he speaks of the fear of “these peaceful shores being disturbed at the bidding of Rome by foreign foe or domestic treason”

as visionary, but he immediately adds that what has, according to him, happened in the renewal of Papal pretensions, is something "more visionary." He would have us believe that he has no fear, but the world knows that the greatest coward is usually the man who boasts of not being afraid. Further on, in the same section, he is convinced that "it must be for some political object of a very tangible kind that the risks of so *daring a raid upon the civil sphere* have been deliberately run." He explains, in the previous sentence, what he intends to convey by the "daring raid." It is the fact of the Court of Rome "lodging formidable demands for power of the vulgar kind." (We have just seen that she has not lodged a single new demand for power of any kind—so much for the raid). He is uneasy about the "struggle" (*sic*) going on in Germany, and he admonishes us that what used to be said of France must now be said of Germany—that "when Germany is disquieted, Europe cannot be at rest." But his particular uneasiness has reference to his pet kingdom of Italy, because Pio Nono will not shake hands with Victor Emmanuel over the robbery of his dominions. And what makes this all the more serious is, that "it is possible that we have here" (that is, in the temporal power of the Pope-dom), the key to the enlargement of the province of obedience beyond the limits of Infallibility, and to the *introduction* of the remarkable phrase—"ad disciplinam et regimen Ecclesie." Remarkable phrase—"the discipline and government of the Church"! It was of

course introduced in the Vatican—it was never heard of before! What a painful exhibition of affected ignorance is all this? What sort of idea of the Catholic Church have you figured to yourself, Mr. Gladstone, when you speak in this fashion? Do you imagine that before the Vatican Council we had no discipline in our ranks, no recognised right of government in our Pontiff?

To sum up: the doctrine of obedience to the Pope in “discipline and the administration of the Church” was not innovated in the Vatican Council. Neither are the other statements made about it correct.

Firstly—It does not, “render the Papal judgments unappealable and irreversible.” The simplest way of disposing of this charge is, to refer at once to those authorities of the thorough Ultramontane type that have treated the question, and take their evidence upon it. Cardinal Bellarmine, Jesuit, is not one to be suspected of any tendency to curtail the prerogative of the Roman Pontiff, and he thinks that a Pontifical law, in order to be a binding law, must be “just.” “Hence,” he says, “if the Pope were to order children, or persons of weak constitution, to fast in Lent as strictly as grown up persons, or those of vigorous constitution, his law would be unjust, and not to be observed; as would also be a law confining the appointment to Bishoprics to the rich and noble, to the exclusion of the poor and lowly born, although equally or better qualified.” “If,” he adds, “the law be not only unjust, but opposed to the law of God, you are bound

to violate it ; if, however, it be, though unjust as a law, not opposed to the law of God, you may be indirectly bound to observe it, lest scandal should be given by its violation.”—*De Romano Pontifice*, lib. iv. cap. 15. Suarez, also a Jesuit and rank Ultramontane, in his “Treatise on Laws,” has the following: “Canonical laws bind in conscience, supposing them to be just. But if a canonical law be evidently unjust, it does not bind. . . . A canonical law binds *particularly* when it is not only just but *moderate*, and not *difficult of fulfilment*. The more severe laws, and those more difficult of observance, also bind, if they be strictly just.” He then raises the question, whether in the case of those “severe and difficult laws,” there lies any right of appeal, or rather remonstrance, and he lays down that in all such canonical laws, even those made by the Pope, it is allowable to interpose a petition against the enforcement of the law, and that a remonstrance so made “from reasonable cause, is very expedient and conformable to sound reason.” He further adds, that in the meantime, if the observance of the law be attended with great inconvenience, such as “upsetting an existing state of things, or causing scandal, by a benign interpretation of the Pontiff’s will, the law may be looked upon as not for the present in force.”

These two great Theologians did not regard the Pope’s decrees, or laws of discipline and administration, as unappealable or irreversible. They would only require the appeal against the law, or petition for its reversion, to be made “*secundum ordinem*,” and from

reasonable causes. It makes nothing against the weight of their authority that they are separated from us by an interval of three centuries or thereabouts ; they still hold foremost rank amongst our classic Theologians. In the search of proof or explanation of Catholic doctrine, we can always have recourse to them, and run through their writings “*inoffenso pede.*”

I think we are now fairly entitled to convert Mr. Gladstone’s “iron gripe” into a silken bond, and to write “fully disproved” over his two assertions—that no man may pass judgment upon Papal mandates, even “when they do not present the credentials of infallibility”—and that the Pope, though “he admits it to be possible that he may be wrong, finds it intolerable to be told so.”

INFERENCES.

If we now summarily rehearse the points that have been established, we shall find that the definition of Infallibility in the Vatican Council was attended with no deviation from the normal teaching system of the Catholic Church, and that it involved no practical change in the belief of its members. Secondly, that the domain of morals has not been enlarged by the striking down of former boundaries for the extension of Papal power, leaving the good or bad of our actions dependent on the *ipse dixit* of the Popes, but that it lies still within its ancient enclosure of the divine and natural laws. Thirdly, that neither in the nature

or the subject matter of obedience to the Pope has any change, speculative or practical, been introduced, "discipline and regimen" having the same meaning now as they ever had, and falling under his authority now in the same way they ever did, and no other.

This being so, we take the liberty to remove the word *now*, the main point of assertion from Mr. Gladstone's proposition—"no one can *now* become her convert without renouncing his mental and moral freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another"—and the statement becomes a general charge against the Catholic Church in all times. This I am certain he did not intend, for it would have been fatal to his real scope, which was to demonstrate that the action of the Vatican Council on the Church was baleful and revolutionary. So that we are at liberty to dismiss this portion of the argument of the Expostulation, if we please. But as this may have the appearance of shirking a difficulty, on the plea that it does not confront us directly, we shall consider the general question—*if it be true that the Roman Catholic faith is irreconcilable with mental and moral freedom and with the duty of allegiance.*

"Mental and moral freedom" is a showy expression, and I am sure that a great many readers of Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet who love fine words, but give themselves little or no trouble about their meaning, have been caught by it. The meaning in the present instance admits of many lines of graduation, among which we have to find out our author's as best we

can. There is, first, the "mental and moral freedom" from all law human or divine, to think as one pleases, to speak as one pleases, to act as one pleases. This can scarcely be meant, though indeed Mr. Gladstone's strictures on the Pope for condemning the first three Propositions of the eighteen given above, would seem to imply something like it, if we take the Propositions as they stood when they were condemned, not as they stand after they have been reduced by our author. At all events, this latitude cannot be allowed to Christians, for St. Paul desires "every intellect to be brought into subjection to Christ," and he has, in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, some notable remarks on the way in which the Greeks and the Jews exercised their mental freedom about the doctrine of Christ. To the Greeks it was unscientific—in fact, "a folly"; to the Jews it was a "scandal," whilst in reality it was the "power of God and the wisdom of God." Mental freedom thus, from the first, appears to have met with some opposition from Christianity. Neither does moral freedom appear to have it all its own way. The Gnostics and the Manichæans, the Adamites a few centuries ago, and the Mormons of the present day, are generally considered to have gone somewhat too far. We must allow of some restraint being placed on our ideas and on our desires, if we would not relapse into the full freedom of ancient Paganism, like a good many around us. We must accept that restraint, at least, which Christ has expressly imposed on those who would have a share with

Him. "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved ; he that believeth not, shall be condemned." And that which was to be believed was the "Gospel," or, as it is given in St. Matthew—" *All things* whatsoever I have commanded you." Our mental and moral freedom must put up with this restriction, if we wish to retain our title to the name of Christians. This restriction, if we examine it carefully and conscientiously, will be found comprehensive to a troublesome degree. In the first place, there are the precepts of the natural law, of which we are made cognizant by the light of reason, and reminded and admonished by conscience at the moment of action. Next come the divine positive precepts, for Christ did "not come to destroy the law but to fulfil," and hence, though the ceremonial law of the Jews was to lose its force and meaning on the establishment and promulgation of Christianity, the moral law of the Decalogue was to retain its full force and obligatory character under the new dispensation. Thirdly, Christ himself, in the founding of His Church, and in making provision for its perpetuity, made many ordinances, and instituted various rites and observances, to which his followers are bound to subject and accommodate themselves. I know there are men who venture to take short cuts through those precepts, and who leave themselves quite at their ease about what they believe; but their theories cannot evacuate the word of Christ, and as He requires His disciples to believe *all* and to do *all* that He commanded them, I can see no

sufficient ground for adopting a lower standard of Christian duty.

There is still another source of restriction of the mental and moral freedom of the Christian arising from the obligation our Lord left us under of "hearing the Church," or, as St. Paul has it, of "obeying those placed over us," which, I presume, Mr. Gladstone acknowledges, but under what limitation I know not. If he accepted it, in the definite sense of subjection to an Infallible Guide, as we do, his mental and moral freedom would have exactly the same range as ours, but as he exercises this freedom beforehand to determine how far he is bound to hear the Church, he secures to himself, but on his own responsibility, a greater latitude in believing what is taught, or complying with what is enjoined, than is allowed to us. To this extent, and no further, does the mental and moral Christian freedom of Mr. Gladstone differ from that of the most observant Roman Catholic.

Before quitting this question, I must protest against the words he selects to express the consequence of ecclesiastical obedience as held by Roman Catholics. He first described it as a "surrender" of mental and moral freedom, but as he advanced in his work, he did not think the word sufficiently strong, and preferred to style it a "forfeiture" of mental and moral freedom. Both designations are inapplicable. That which I either *forfeit* or *surrender* passes out of my possession—I lose my control over it. In the first case I am deprived of it by another, and in punishment of a

crime ; in the second, I deprive myself of it by a voluntary act. When a man becomes a convert to Catholicity he no more *forfeits* or *surrenders* his mental and moral freedom than he does when he changes his doctor or his lawyer. The Pope may be more exacting as to faith and morals than the system he has left, but so also may be the new doctor or lawyer in their peculiar requisitions. An exercise of mental and moral freedom, full, deliberate, and momentous in its object, is gone through in the process of conversion. After conversion, mental and moral freedom is exercised in perseverance in the faith ; for, the convert to Catholicity is not, like the helpless captive chained hand and foot to his prison bench, incapable of escape, but is left to the full freedom of a rational man, to stay or to return. Nothing interferes with his mental or moral freedom in the matter except the brightness of the light that drew him to the Church, and the joy and the peace he has found within her. In the fulfilment of his duties as a Catholic, he, in common with his brethren in communion, exercises his mental and moral freedom every day, and perhaps every hour ; for it is not in the wide fling of licence, the exclusion of all obligation and restraint, that rational liberty most perfectly acts its part, but in the careful balancing of motives, and in the selection of that side to which our better judgment inclines, and it is the triumph of human liberty when this better selection is made, despite of difficulties and temptations from without and weakness within.

In one word, we Catholics do not *forfeit* our freedom, we do not *surrender* it, but we *submit* ourselves in the use of it to an authority higher than we can pretend to be, and this for reasons clear and convincing to us.

ALLEGIANCE.

The last nut, and as Mr. Gladstone thinks—and indeed as some of those who have written replies to this Expostulation think also—the hardest, is Allegiance as affected by the Vatican Council through the Decree of Papal Infallibility. I cannot take this view of it. To my judgment the duty of allegiance to the sovereign is as little affected by Papal Infallibility as the duty of honesty to the neighbour—perhaps, strictly speaking, less. Allegiance implies two things, a duty and a fact, or rather a duty supposing and resting upon a fact. The duty is a point of morals, and thus within the sphere of the Pope's direction. He inculcates its necessity in the usual way in which all their moral duties are inculcated on Catholics, through his Bishops, his Parish Priests, and his approved Theological writers. Peaceable subjection to the established rulers, and compliance with the laws under which they live, are taught to be the duty of Christians, and the teaching is ordinarily confirmed by reference to the words of St. Paul : “ He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God ”—Romans, xiii. Popes in our own times have more than once come out with the full weight of their

authority to denounce theories directed against the moral duty of allegiance—instance the Encyclical Letter, “*Mirari*,” of Gregory XVI., 15th August, 1832, in which he declares the right of revolt not admissible, and asserts the “*immobilis subjectio in principes*,” which “the precepts of the Christian religion enforce;” also the Apostolic Letter of Leo XII., “*Quo graviora*,” in which secret organizations against the supreme *civil authority*, as well as those against the Church, are reprobated and subjected to censure, not to mention the various declarations of Pius IX. to the same effect.

The *fact*, that is, the title or ground on which the duty of allegiance rests, being a purely temporal matter, does not lie within the domain of Papal authority. Given the fact of a legitimate ruler, it belongs to the Pope to teach us our moral obligations to him, but it does not belong to him to teach us who the legitimate ruler is, or even to decide between different claimants, as in Spain at present, with which of them the right is to be found. Such questions as these are determinable by other authorities, and on principles quite distinct from Ecclesiastical ones at present. This, however, was not always so. There were times when the fact, as well as the duty, was left to the Pope to decide on. But then the decision in the two cases did not come from the same, or the same kind of authority. In one case it came from an authority established by Christ, sacred and permanent—in the other it came from an authority which Christian princes and peoples

naturally recognised as a suitable one to be exercised over them by their great spiritual Ruler and common Father. That state of things is now completely changed. The Roman Pontiff counts his spiritual subjects by millions and millions, but the kings and the rulers of the earth have repudiated him. Is the change for the better or for the worse? Opinions differ, but one may ask—What Supreme Court of Appeal has been substituted to which kings and peoples may now bring their differences and disputes for quiet arrangement before having recourse to the fearful arbitrement of war? What chance of escape has a small nationality at present if a big neighbour wishes to extinguish it, except another big neighbour becomes jealous? There is no rule of right in these days, save

“The good old rule, the simple plan,
“That they would take who have the power, and they would
keep who can.”

The great objection to this old Papal authority in temporals was the subjection and servitude in which kings and princes were said to be placed by it. The extent and the onerous character of this subjection is a question on which writers are immensely divided; but, at all events, it never reached the degree of cowardly dependence on the will of another in which all the governments of Europe are found at present, when the great German Chancellor appears to hold the balance of power in the hollow of his hand, and it

needs but the sound of his voice to make peace or war.

A few practical questions now, and we may close this chapter on Allegiance. The first—Is my allegiance, since the Vatican Decree of Infallibility, at the *mercy of another*?

It is as much since as before, that is—it is not at all. My allegiance, inasmuch as it is a moral duty, is, like all my other moral duties, under the guidance of the Pope, as already described, but even in this respect it is not “at his mercy.” He must guide me on the fixed basis of Christian morals, and, as I have said above, he has no power to make or unmake these, but only to guard them, to impart them, and, in their doubtful or remote conclusions, to interpret them.

Second question—Can the Pope, through the claim he has on my obedience, interfere with my duty of allegiance?

He cannot; the object of obedience is “the discipline and regimen of the Church,” and is quite removed from the duty of allegiance. Mr. Gladstone is mistaken when he brings the obedience which Catholics hold themselves bound by to the Pope, in proof of the insecurity of their allegiance; it is not here, but in his capacity of Teacher of Morals, that allegiance comes under his control as far as it does come under it. He makes a similar mistake in his enumeration of the net-full of facts that are swept into the Pontiff’s

hands by the doctrine of obedience. "Marriage, burial, education, prison discipline, blasphemy, poor relief vows of celibacy and obedience ;" the right to interfere in these, as is evident from their nature, comes to the Pope, not through the channel of *obedience*, but through that of *faith and morals*.

Third question—In the impossible hypothesis of the Pope being engaged in a war with England, how would the allegiance of English Catholics be affected? Should they throw up their allegiance and fight for the Pope, or might they throw up the Pope and fight with their countrymen? And how would it be if they were soldiers or sailors?

I have no hesitation in replying, that in the case proposed, the simple duty of allegiance is not affected at all. The English Catholic is bound to observe the laws, and to remain subject to the supreme authorities of his country, just as he would be in case she was at war, not with the Pope, but with some purely temporal power. The question of taking share in the war is one that depends for its solution on the justice or injustice of the undertaking, more than on the matter of allegiance. If I be a free combatant, I cannot in conscience commit myself to a wrong cause for all the allegiances or love of country in the universe. For non-free combatants, such as soldiers or sailors, the question is attended practically with still less difficulty, for, *nolens volens*, they must go where they are ordered under penalties too grave

to be despised. But some one will urge—the Pope may issue a mandate enforced by an annexed excommunication, forbidding all Catholics to engage in the war against him. As we are admitting all extreme hypotheses, we shall admit this also, and reply that the supposed action of the Pope does not change the question materially. His mandate will derive its force from his authoritative declaration of the immorality of the war, and the censure annexed will have to be subjected to the ordinary rules and principles of ecclesiastical punishments. For instance, the soldiers and sailors would not incur it, because *grave fear* excuses from censure, censures being directed against the contumacious, not against those who act through fear or coercion. Catholic Theology is truly liberal in its views on practical questions of this kind, in which clashing interests are involved, or peculiar individual difficulties arise in the fulfilment of a precept. It is a trite principle with it, that mere ecclesiastical laws do not bind when there would be a very grave inconvenience in their observance, and it denies, as a rule, to any human legislator the power of making laws or precepts, binding men to the performance of actions, which, from the danger and difficulty attendant on their fulfilment, are esteemed heroic.

We may make and solve cases of this kind to the end of the chapter, but we shall not find ourselves nearer to the solution of the difficulty about Catholics and their allegiance, as *it exists in Mr. Gladstone's*

mind. It is not allegiance in its ordinary acceptation that he demands of us, but *obedience*, complete, total, and absolute. It is not in its own sphere alone, but in the spiritual sphere also, that he asserts the supremacy of the civil power. The words of Christ—"My kingdom is not of this world"—supply his great argument, but he should remember, that texts of Sacred Scripture are sometimes, like double-edged swords, cutting in both directions. If it be good reasoning, that because "Christ's kingdom is not of this world," it should not interfere with this world—it is equally good, that because "Christ's kingdom is not of this world," this world should not interfere with *it*. What he says about whole multitudes of facts being swept into the Papal net by the doctrine of obedience, "*mutato nomine*," is true of himself and the State. For him, there is no power, no right, no authority, except in the State or from the State. The State is great, and Mr. Gladstone is its prophet.

In his practical reflexions on this supposed instability of the allegiance of converts to Roman Catholicism, our author finds great consolation from the fact, "that the conquests have been chiefly amongst *women*." As far as this means a sneer, I have nothing to say to it ; as far as it means a point, I have just this to say—when Christ was making converts Himself, the firmest, the most unselfish, the most faithful to Him were *women*. When He hung upon His Cross, and the *men* all deserted Him, it is a Mary, and a Mary, and a

Mary that are recorded to have remained beside Him to the end, and it was a Mary, and a Mary, that kept guard at His sepulchre.

Very little more remains to be commented on. I cannot prevent Mr. Gladstone from calling the Curia Romana "a baleful power," or from having a fling at the Jesuits, "the deadliest foes that mental and moral liberty have ever known"—a rather new charge against them; they are generally described by their enemies as too facile and accommodating in their doctrines. But as long as he deals merely in abuse, and does not misrepresent the teaching or the system of our Church, we can afford to let him pass. Towards the close of the Expostulation something turns up about the opposition of the Irish Bishops to his scheme of University Education, which, some people think, gives us the key to the whole proceeding of Mr. Gladstone. It is the postscript to his letter. Had things gone differently, had the Bill received the sanction in place of the unanimous reprobation of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, it is believed that our politico-theological literature would never have been enriched by the present controversy, and the mental and moral freedom and civil allegiance, even of converts, would have been as little source of fear or annoyance to him as they had been from July 18th, 1870—the date of the Vatican Definition—to February, 1873—the date of the proposal of his University Bill. The disappointment he met with on that

occasion is said to have utterly changed him—to have soured his nature at its very sources. But surely this is no reason why the Pope, and the Church Universal, and the Syllabus, and the Vatican Council, and lady converts, should be borne upon so unmercifully. His aversion to the Pope shows itself plainly enough in the course of the Expostulation; but as these pages are going to press, an article appears in the *Quarterly*, W. E. Gladstone, M.P., *auctore*, in which the Holy Father is spoken of in a manner transgressing all bounds of propriety.

The occasion of this new attack is the publication of a collection of brief Addresses or Discourses, spoken by the Pontiff to various little knots of visitors to the Vatican from 1870 to 1873. Read with a sympathizing, or even an impartial eye, there is nothing in the volumes to startle or to offend. The Holy Father throughout speaks in the spirit of his sacred office. He commends his children for their faithfulness; he adverts now and then to the wrongs that he, and the Church through him, have been made to suffer; he reprehends the acts of injustice of which he is the victim, and their authors; but at the same time that he reprobates the crime, he prays fervently that God may change the heart of the criminal. His language is, as becomes the Vicar of Christ, not the language of worldly wisdom, nor are his views the suggestions of human prudence, but words and thoughts spring together from the same source, the deep and ever-

present consciousness of his Divine commission. Mr. Gladstone cannot, for he will not, see the Pope in this light. His fundamental view is, that the Pope has suffered nothing, has lost nothing, has had no treacherous dealings to complain of, no promises solemnly made to him shamefully broken, has witnessed no imprisonment of Bishops, no desecration of holy places, no plunder of properties set apart by their original owners for charitable and religious purposes, has never heard the angry murmurs of the *reduci* in the square of St. Peter's, nor the shouts—"a basso il Papa," "morte a'l Papa," "morte ai preti," and—one trembles to write it—"morte a Gesu Christo"!! Nor the chanting of the infernal litany: "Pius is Pope"—refrain—"Pius be d——d!" "Gregory was Pope"—"Gregory be d——d!" "Simon Peter was Pope"—"Simon Peter be d——d!" "Jesus Christ was the first Pope"—! Whoever would authenticate the fact of these frightful excesses of impiety, can do so by referring to page 368 of a work published in Paris—Librairie de Victor Palmè, 25, Rue de Grenelle, Saint Germain, 1874, entitled—*Histoire de l'Invasion des Etats Pontificaux et du Siege de Rome*—Par le Comte de Beaufort.

Mr. Gladstone has the peculiar property of stripping certain inconvenient facts of their reality, and appropriating the pilfered attribute to beings of his own imagination for the purpose of making his theory run smoothly. With him the Pope's sufferings are all imaginary, self-indulged—on the contrary, the

Italian Government is patient, tolerant, self-sacrificing, "making over with a lavish prodigality the *ecclesiastical powers and privileges* of the *monarchy (sic)* . . . to the *Papal chair!*" The friends of the Pope are a baleful set, whose "fixed purpose is to re-erect the terrestrial throne of the Popedom, even if it can only be re-erected on the ashes of the city, and amidst the whitening bones of its people." On the other hand, the enemies of the Pope, the senders forth of the impious and murderous shouts just recorded, the disciples of the apostle of assassination, are not to have a word said against them, nor even a prayer asked for their conversion, lest it should be calculated to hurt their feelings. Everything, according to him, went wrong in Rome under the Pope's administration; everything goes right now, even to an improvement in *the morals* of the inhabitants! The latter is vouched for by some source of information thought to be reliable by Mr. Gladstone, and also by some tabulated figures. We know enough of Italian statesmen's veracity, and of Mr. Gladstone's accuracy of quotation by this time, to pay much attention to either. The print and picture shops on the Corso, and the *sale dansante* in various parts of the city, tell a different tale of Roman morality at present.

The Pope has not the same facility as our author for annihilating or transferring the reality of facts. Error is to him error, and injustice is injustice; he must condemn the one and denounce the

other in his Letters, in his Encyclicals, in his Allocutions, in his *Discourses*. "He cannot run with the thief, nor be a partaker with adulterers." To him it belongs, and in the first place, "to preach the word in season and out of season," and his use of scriptural language, and his frequent reference to scriptural phrases and incidents, are therefore in strict consistency with his office. All this is but matter of ridicule to Mr. Gladstone, so distorted are his views of everything that Pius IX. says or does. The passage, however, to which I will invite the special attention of the reader, and with which I shall close my remarks on the author of the "Expostulation," and of the article in the *Quarterly*, is conceived in a spirit much more to be deplored than that of even wanton ridicule. The tone is no longer that of the dissentient Christian, but of the scoffer—the infidel who delights to wound the sensitiveness of the believer by the irreverent use of words, or profane application of truths, that are to him most sacred.

"We had already and often seen Infallibility in full dress—in peacock's plumes," he writes, "but Don Pasquale has taken us behind the scenes. He has shown us Infallibility in the *closet*, Infallibility in *dishabille*, Infallibility able to *cut its capers* at will, to indulge in its *wildest romps* with freedom and impunity." There is nothing given by Mr. Gladstone from the "Discourses of Pio Nono"—there is nothing in the Discourses to warrant the use of language such

as this. "Cutting capers at will, indulging in wildest romps with impunity," are performances in no possible sense applicable to the aged Pontiff, and are, therefore, applied to him only at the expense of truth. Want of truth is, however, a minor fault in comparison with the gross irreverence and profanity of the words. Men of all shades of Christian belief hold in profound respect the promises of our Lord Jesus Christ, however they may differ in their ideas about the manner of their fulfilment. Here is one of His most magnificent promises, or, to speak more exactly, here is the object of many of His most consoling and comforting promises to His Church, the gift of inerrancy in faith, implying and involving the *assistance of the Spirit of Truth*, brought in for no other purpose than to be scoffed at—"Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." These words of Christ are the ground on which the doctrine of Infallibility rests. The awful, though invisible, presence of the Son of God is the way in which Infallibility is secured. The promise of Christ, and the presence of Christ, make up the idea of Infallibility, and this is the idea that is mixed up by Mr. Gladstone with "capers," and "wildest romps," and "dishabille," and "peacock's plumes"!!! Dr. Newman, in his charity, calls this a "religious mind"—if it ever was such, it must have been "guilty of a violent breach with its own history" before it set to work at its Expostulation, or its article in the *Quarterly*.

My business with Mr. Gladstone ends here. I have nothing to do with his consideration of the future policy of British Statesmen in relation to Roman Catholics, under the present supposed doubtful condition of their allegiance. I will only say that if I held his premises, I should feel myself compelled to hold a different conclusion from his. But before ending with my readers, I will crave their attention to a few details which may help them to a better understanding of the now famous Vatican Council.

The first public announcement of a General Council to be held in the Church of the Vatican was made in June of the year 1867, by Pío Nono himself, to the Bishops then assembled in Rome in great numbers to celebrate the Centenary of St. Peter. The day fixed for the opening of the Council was the 8th of December, 1869, in order to allow sufficient time for making the necessary preparations at Rome, and also to enable the Bishops to make provision for a prolonged absence from their Dioceses. All Bishops in communion with the Holy See, and having care of souls, were summoned to the Council according to ecclesiastical usage. This act constituted the Council Œcumenical in *convocation*. The summons was not a mere invitation, which might be accepted or declined *ad libitum*. Any Bishop wishing to be absent from the Council was obliged to send on his grounds for asking an exemption to the "Congregation of Excuses and Complaints," and to name a Procurator, to whom, however, no conciliar authority passed.

On the assembling of the Council, the business to be gone through was divided between four Congregations, or Deputations, each Congregation being composed of twenty-four Bishops, presided over by a Cardinal, and having Theologians and Canonists to assist them. From the first announcement of the Council, the Holy Father had invited to Rome, from different parts of the Christian world, men skilled in Theology and Canon Law to confer with the Theologians and Canonists of Rome itself, and to prepare matter appertaining to the object for which the Council was convoked. Their *Schemata*, or the forms of Decrees and Canons prepared by them, were submitted to the examination of the Bishops "integra integre," that is, *entirely*, bringing with them no kind of Pontifical approbation. They were printed and sent round some days before each General Congregation, or Session of all the Bishops, that the Fathers might have an opportunity of giving them careful consideration, and of forming a mature opinion about the subjects on which they were to be called on for a vote. In this preparatory investigation, the Bishops were allowed to employ the services of consulting Theologians with whom they might examine the matter and the wording of the *Schemata*, and each Bishop was free to give a dissentient opinion on either matter or wording in the General Congregation; but for the purpose of observing the necessary order of the Council, notice of his intention to speak should be given at least the day before. It is a matter worthy of note, as evincing the

perfect freedom of investigation and of discussion that prevailed, that what between the Bishops and their Theologians, scarcely a single *Schema* was allowed to pass in the form and words in which it had been originally drawn up. In several instances not a single word of the form in which it was at first proposed was allowed to remain.

The proposition of matter lay chiefly with the Congregations, but it was by no means confined to them. In the second section of the "*Litteræ Apostolicæ*," that prescribes the order and defines the rules to be observed in the Council, the Fathers are not only permitted, but exhorted, if they have any matter to propose that they think conducive to the public good to do so. Thus discussion was free, and proposition of matter for discussion was free—in Theological language, the Council was Œcumenical in *celebration*. Indeed, so free was discussion, that the question of the Infallibility of the Pope occupied in all nearly fourteen days, and had about seventy Fathers during that time pleading for and against its claim to be made the object of a definition of faith. In the end, Fathers who had entered their names on the list as speakers, seeing that the subject had been abundantly examined, began to withdraw them, and a general feeling that it was time to proceed to definition began to prevail. The discussion then ceased, and the public Session was held on the eighteenth July, when 533 voted *placet*, or in favour of—2 only *non placet*, or against the definition

of Papal Infallibility as a truth of Faith. A number of Bishops, some say eighty, absented themselves from the Council. Many of them had obtained permission to leave, and had actually left Rome between the previous general Congregation and the public Session. But going or remaining, their share in the Council ceased when they abstained from its Session, nor would their presence, with eighty-two *non placets* in place of two, have made any difference in the issue. The Pope, with a large majority of Bishops, was always held, even in times of the most advanced Gallicanism, to be an Infallible Definer.







